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NON-ENFORCEMENT TAKINGS
TIMOTHY M. MULVANEY*
Abstract: The non-enforcement of existing property laws is not logically sepa-
rable from the issue of unfair and unjust state deprivations of property rights at
which the Constitution's Takings Clause takes aim. This Article suggests, there-
fore, that takings law should police allocations resulting from non-enforcement
decisions on the same "fairness and justice" grounds that it polices allocations
resulting from decisions to enact and enforce new regulations. Rejecting the ex-
tant majority position that state decisions not to enforce existing property laws
are categorically immune from takings liability is not to advocate that persons
impacted by such decisions should be automatically or even regularly entitled to
the Takings Clause's constitutional remedy. Rather, it simply suggests that
courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and categorically prohibit
non-enforcement takings claims in favor of assessing those claims on the merits.
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' Though this
provision originally applied only to physical appropriations resulting from
governmental conduct, 2 courts more recently have interpreted it to constrain
c Timothy M. Mulvaney, 2018. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Texas A&M University School
of Law; Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School (2016 17). Thank you to David Callies, John Ech-
everria, Christine Klein, John Lovett, Christopher Odinet, Christopher Serkin, Joseph Singer, and
Gregory Stein for their thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript on non-enforce-
ment takings and to Robert Anderson, Jack Beerman, Stephen Clowney, John Infranca, Lee Anne
Fennell, Gerald Frug, Frank Michelman Michael Pappas, Sarah Schindler, Henry Smith, Laum
Underkuffler, and Michael Wolf for insightful conversations on the topic. I benefitted from the
opportunity to present various iterations of this project at Fordhan Law School, the University of
Georgia School of Law, the University of Oklahoma College of Law, Queen's University Belfast,
the University of Oxford, Texas A&M University School of Law, Tulane University Law School,
and Villanova University School of Law, as well as the 2016 Association of American Law
Schools Annual Meeting in New York. I am grateful for the fine research assistance of Henrik
Strand and Lola Wilson. Special thanks to Texas A&M University and Harvard University for
supporting this research.1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 792 (1995). The Supreme Court has acknowledged as
much. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) ("Prior to Justice Holmes's
exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, ... it was generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, ... or the functional equivalent of a
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certain regulatory decisions, too.3 "Regulatory takings" claims, as they have
come to be known, ordinarily are based on the government's enactment and
anticipated enforcement of a new regulatory safeguard or obligation affecting
the use of the claimant's property. Indeed, no federal or state court has found
a taking based on the non-enforcement of an existing regulation against a
third party, and most courts to have addressed such claims have rejected them
summarily. Calling into question this majority view, this Article suggests that
although takings claims grounded in non-enforcement, like traditional regula-
tory takings claims, rarely should succeed, they should be assessed on the
merits to assure that the impositions resulting therefrom are fair and just ab-
sent compensation.
The argument proceeds in three major parts. Part I first outlines what
might be termed a democratic understanding of regulatory takings law.4 On
this view, property is regarded as a socially crafted institution necessarily ac-
countable to the values that characterize our democracy. It follows that the
substance of property laws must be collectively adjusted as social, economic,
and moral perspectives on the content of these values-and conceptions of
what might harm these values-change over time. An expectation that the
Takings Clause should significantly obstruct these adjustments seems incon-
sistent with the understanding that property exists in service of democratic
values. Regulatory takings law, if in fits and starts, has recognized as much.
At the same time, though, takings jurisprudence also reflects courts' apprecia-
tion for the idea that property owners and non-owners alike reasonably expect
that these adjustments to property laws and the allocative impositions that
result from them will be made in accord with the democratic principles of
fairness and justice. The meaning of these principles is determined-and
evolves-through contextualized application of the considerations that the
U.S. Supreme Court famously set out in its 1978 decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,5 as these considerations have been illu-
minated by precedent.
The Part describes how courts to date ordinarily have entertained only
those regulatory takings claims based on the government's enactment and
anticipated enforcement of a new regulatory safeguard or obligation affecting
the use of the claimant's property, and not those based on the non-enforce-
'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession' (citing Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1879)).
' See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 38 (1978); Pa. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 16 (1922).
4 See infra notes 11 78 and accompanying text.
5 438 U.S. at 124 28.
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ment of an existing regulation affecting the property of another.6 This majori-ty view that categorically opposes consideration of takings claims grounded
in the non-enforcement of law operates on the premise that non-enforcement
is not an exercise of state power that should be conceived of as capable of
depriving individuals of private property.
Part II contends that much as the state makes an allocative decision
when it enacts and enforces new regulatory safeguards and obligations, it also
makes an allocative decision when it decides not to enforce those already ex-
isting safeguards and obligations. 7 In a constitutional democracy, the state
must define and enforce private property rights. In doing so, it necessarily
must make choices amongst competing claims to rivalrous resources. Thus,
the state should be understood as exercising its power in the property sphere
whether it enacts and enforces an existing law or refrains from doing so, for
resolving any property dispute unavoidably involves its making an allocative
choice to assign an interest to one party and not to another. Each instance of
allocation, therefore, theoretically invokes the principles of fairness and jus-
tice that underlie takings law.
This assertion is not intended to suggest that broad swaths of non-
enforcement decisions instantly should be deemed constitutionally problemat-
ic; indeed, the state's omnipresence in allocating property rights is reason
enough why takings liability should be reserved for only especially extreme
cases. The claim here is far more modest: there are very exceptional instances
where the state's non-enforcement of existing regulatory safeguards and obli-
gations rises to the level of fundamental unfairness and injustice absent com-
pensation. Courts should leave space for open conversation and debate on the
merits of individual cases to determine whether adjustments to property allo-
cations that occur via non-enforcement are fair and just without the provision
of compensation, just as they have done in cases involving adjustments to
property allocations that occur via the state's enactment and anticipated en-
forcement of new regulations.8
Through a series of examples, Part III considers the application of regu-
latory takings law, as defined in Part I, to the types of allocative decisions-
those grounded in the non-enforcement of existing property laws-discussed
in Part 11. 9 These examples include typical disputes involving the non-
6 See infra notes 11 78 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 79 165 and accompanying text.
8 This Article generally leaves aside as fodder for future work the prospect of applying tak-
ings law to non-enactment situations, i.e., situations in which a deprivation occurs as a result of
the state's choosing not to enact a particular regulatory safeguard or obligation. For a brief discus-
sion of the topic, see infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 166 273 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of common law trespass, roadway maintenance laws, and ve-
hicular speed limits, in which takings liability seems quite unlikely, as well as
disputes involving the non-enforcement of flood control plans, water pollu-
tion discharge permits, and rental housing codes, where the takings issue pos-
es more challenging questions than most courts have allowed to date. Collec-
tively, these "easier" and "harder" illustrations present a platform to explore
how one might evaluate a non-enforcement decision's alignment with the
democratic norms of fairness and justice that drive regulatory takings law.
The Article concludes that considering non-enforcement takings liability
reveals the possibility that takings law may assume a role that does not so
much limit democratic lawmaking on property-as regulatory takings law is
so often conceived-but, instead, one that enhances it by helping to assure
that non-enforcement decisions, like enactment and enforcement decisions,
are fair and just absent compensation. 10
I. TAKINGS AND DEMOCRACY
Property presents an inevitable tension. A number of property's benefits
stem from the ability of owners to make life decisions on the belief that the
scope of their property holdings will remain relatively stable. At the same
time, the citizenry surely must be able to collectively adjust the meaning of
ownership as social, economic, and moral perspectives change over time.
Regulatory takings law, among other doctrines, performs the difficult task of
mediating this tension.
The development of regulatory takings law largely has rebuffed the as-
sumption, at least implicitly adopted by a great number of commentators of
varying ideological perspectives, that the Takings Clause should be interpret-
ed to assure economically efficient regulation." Instead, this body of law op-
1o See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
Among the wealth of literature that understands takings law through the lens of efficiency,
see, for example, Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137 38 (1992); Michael A. Heller & James E.
Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022 25
(1999); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 602
06 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986);
Richard Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 553, 563 65 (1998). See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995) (using different theories of economic analysis to formu-
late a regulatory takings doctrine). Adherents to efficiency-based takings theories must confront,
among other challenges, the absence of verifiable empirical evidence determining whether it is
more efficient to force the government to internalize the external costs of regulation (and thereby
allow property owners to ignore the external costs of their investments), or to do just the opposite
20181
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erates on the presupposition that the Constitution does not announce any min-
imum standards for property. 12 Property laws-whether wealth-maximizing
or not-are adopted through democratic means for the avowed purposes of
furthering the public interest and promoting the values that characterize our
system of self-governance. 13
On this presupposition, takings law should not be-and generally has
not been-interpreted to restrict the democratic process of definition and ad-
justment of property allocations. As Section A sets out, however, takings law
provides some assurance that property adjustments will be fairly and justly
administered so as not to produce targeted or specialized impositions that dis-
respect the same interests and values that the institution of property is intend-
ed to serve. 14 Section B explains that regulatory takings law's "fairness and
justice" analysis generally has been confined to situations in which the gov-
ernment has enacted and sought to enforce new regulatory safeguards or obli-
gations on the claimant landowner, and deemed inapplicable to instances in
which the government fails to enforce existing regulations against third par-
ties. 15
A. A Democratic Approach to Regulatory Takings Law
The foundations of a democratic approach to takings law can be traced,
like so many insights in property and takings law, to the early writings of Pro-
fessor Joseph Sax. 16 Ironically, the great legal realist, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, served as Professor Sax's foil. Early in the twentieth century, Justice
Holmes grounded takings analysis in an economic comparison of the dispari-
ty between the pre-regulation economic burden distribution and the post-
regulation economic burden distribution through the claimant's eyes to in-
quire whether she reaps an "average" reciprocity of economic advantage from
(force property owners to internalize the external costs of their investments and make it more
likely that the government will ignore the external costs of regulation).
12 See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COM-
MON GOOD 263 (2003).
" See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 309, 330 (2006); Timothy M. Mul-
vaney & Joseph William Singer, Move Along to Where? Property in Service of Democracy: A
Tribute to Andre van der Walt (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 17-40, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract id-2976009.
14 See infra notes 16 52 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 53 78 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [here-
inafter Sax, Police Power]; Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971).
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the challenged regulation.' 7 Professor Sax countered in 1964 by describing
takings compensation as an appropriate "bulwark against unfairness, rather
than [as Holmes had insinuated] against mere value diminution" resulting
from the "burdens" of regulation.' 8 Professor Sax decried rigid definitions of
property as fixed in reference to existing economic values in favor of defining
property as "the value which each owner has left after the inconsistencies be-
tween ... competing owners have been resolved." 19 To Professor Sax, courts
adjudicating takings claims must ask: "[A]gainst what qualitative kinds of
value-diminishing acts should existing values be insulated?,
20
Professor Sax's theory quickly worked its way into takings doctrine. In
1969, the Court pointed to Professor Sax's work, alongside that of just one
other scholar-Frank Michelman, himself a monumental figure in takings
law-as offering a worthy "general discussion of the purposes" of the Tak-
ings Clause.2 Various justices would proceed to draw on and cite to Professor
Sax's perspective on takings law in several of the Court's most important tak-
ings decisions in the twenty-five years that followed 2
1 See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 539 40 (1914) (finding that a Penn-
sylvania statute prohibiting the extraction of coal along property boundaries did not amount to a
compensable taking because all affected mine owners would be reciprocally benefitted). The re-
sult of Justice Holmes' exposition, at least on this interpretation, is that no owner can, on net, bear
a diminution-at least any sizable diminution in one's property value at the hands of govern-
ment regulation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring mine owners to keep coal in place to prevent surface subsidence did
not secure the mine owners an "average reciprocity of advantage" but rather redistributed value
from the mine owners to the surface owners. See 260 U.S. at 422.
" See Sax, Police Power, supra note 16, at 57 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 61; see also LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND
POWER 150 51 (2003) (contending that a presumption exists in favor of protecting the claimed
property right only where the values that the right reflects are distinct from the values reflected in
the public interest opposing that right).
20 Sax, Police Power, supra note 16, at 61, 63 64 (asking "to what kind of competition ought
existing values be exposed; and, from what kind of competition ought existing values be protect-
ed") (emphasis added). Professor Sax attributes nearly as much to the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Causby. See id. at 68 (citing Causby's explanation that "it is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it... that determines the question of whether it
is a taking" (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946))).
21 Nat'l Bd. ofYMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 90 n.2 (1969).
"Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023, 1025; Nollanv. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 864 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
n.20, 497 n.25 (1987); Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 199 n.17 (1985); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 649 50 n.15 (1981); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 34 n.30. Professor Michelman has been
attributed with establishing the theoretical landscape for economic models of the takings issue and
takings analyses grounded in John Rawls' conception of fairness. See generally Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Michelman as Doctrinalist, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 371 (2006) (referring to Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
20181
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In its 1978 decision in Penn Central, the Court, relying heavily on the
writings of Professors Sax and Michelman, identified a non-exclusive list of
considerations that courts should take into account in attempting to determine
in an individual case whether an imposition stemming from a new regulatory
safeguard or obligation is fair and just absent compensation .2 3 To decide
when "fairness and justice require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain concentrated
on a few persons," the Court in Penn Central and its progeny counseled low-
er court judges to "engag[e] in... ad hoc factual inquiries" that include con-
sidering (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the claimant's investment-
backed expectations; and (3) the "character of the governmental action. "24
The goals of "fairness and justice" and the considerations that Penn
Central suggested to advance these goals in takings cases are of limited con-
tent in the abstract. However, the expansive body of Supreme Court and low-
er court takings cases has given meaning to both the Penn Central considera-
pensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967)). Professor Sax's perspective on takings is decid-
edly focused on fairness, and the account I offer in this article better tracks that of Professor Sax
than the principally utilitarian account set out by Professor Michelman. See Sax, Police Power,
supra note 16, at 57. My account, however, bears some markings of Professor Michelman's theo-
ry, too, including perhaps most significantly his emphasis on parties other than traditional takings
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Michelman, supra, at 1214 16 (discussing "demoralization costs," which he
defines as the psychological impact on non-parties when a takings claimant is not afforded com-
pensation).
23 438 U.S. at 124, 128 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); see
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (describing the considerations explicitly referenced in Penn Central
as "keenly relevant"); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 ("In Penn Central ... the Court surveyed some of
the general principles governing the Takings Clause.") (emphasis added). Various lower court
opinions discuss the non-exclusivity of the considerations explicitly identified in Penn Central as
relevant to regulatory takings claims. See, e.g., Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d
186, 213 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Herzberg v. County of Plumas, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 597 98
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The Shaw court described the three considerations documented in Penn
Central as the "principle guidelines" but explained how the California courts have "identified
from United States Supreme Court cases ... a number of additional, nonexclusive factors that
might be relevant considerations in a particular case of an alleged Penn Central regulatory tak-
ing." Shaw, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213 14, 214 n.38; see also Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condemna-
tion Litigation in the 1990s the Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme Court's Lucas and Yee Deci-
sions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 88 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not
"comprehensively identified" the factors to be considered in a regulatory takings case and that the
Penn Central decision is the closest it has come to identifying such factors). The Supreme Court's
June 2017 opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin includes language supportive of non-exclusivity. 137 S.
Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (referring to "a complex of factors including" the types of considerations
noted in Penn Central and asserting that the "central dynamic of the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence... is its flexibility").
24 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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tions and the goals that they were intended to serve 25 Although space con-
straints preclude an exhaustive account, a condensed summary of the leading
interpretations of the Penn Central considerations' pursuit of "fairness and
justice" is sufficient to set out the most prominent aspects of the doctrine.
As an initial matter, it is now evident that, outside the unique context
of land use exactions, 26 the "situation-specific" approach of Penn Central is
applicable to almost all regulatory takings cases. 2 7 Soon after Penn Central,
the Court briefly attempted to identify situations in which new regulatory
safeguards and obligations amount to takings per se. Most prominently, these
situations involve regulations that result in permanent physical occupation of
land by a stranger or deprive land of all economically viable uses, as set out,
respectively, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation in
1982 and Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992. However, this
attempt has been exposed as a mere application of the Penn Central consider-
ations in cases in which one consideration so intensely weighs in favor of the
claimant that the others may be either largely unnecessary or unworthy to
contemplate in any depth. 28 Despite some rhetorical dicta to the contrary,
25 See Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601,
631 54 (2015) (describing how Supreme Court and lower court takings cases give meaning to the
considerations identified in Penn Central and the goals they serve). This is not to suggest that the
courts always have been as explicit as they might be in explaining the extent to which the Penn
Central considerations shed light on the fairness and justice of the governmental decision at issue
in takings cases. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 747 48 (2004) (arguing that although the Court
consistently mentions "justice" and "fairness" as guiding principles behind the Takings Clause, it
often does not sufficiently reference "justice" and "fairness" when discussing the primary issues
of a takings case).
26 I have written at some length in the past on the distinctive takings analysis applicable in
those instances where the state attaches exactions, or certain conditions, to development permits.
See generally, Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactionsfor the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511 (2012)
[hereinafter Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future]; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions
and Progressive Property, 40 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 137 (2016) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Legisla-
tive Exactions]; Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 66
(2015); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277 (2011);
Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 189 (2010).
27 There are limited exceptions for what Professor Singer has described as "core property
rights." See Singer, supra note 25, at 644-47 (discussing Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997)
(involving the right to pass property to others upon one's death); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987) (discussing the right to pass property to others upon one's death); Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding in a narrow circumstance that the interest
earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of
the Fifth Amendment); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the govern-
ment's complete destruction of a materialman's lien in certain property constituted a "taking")).
28 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 (asserting that "[w]here 'permanent physical occupation' of
land is concerned, we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensa-
tion), no matter how weighty the asserted 'public interests' involved") (citation omitted); Loretto,
458 U.S. at 441 (declaring that "permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph
20181
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these "categorical rules" are anything but categorical. Numerous examples
indicate that the importance of the public interest in the regulation at issue
matters in applying Loretto and Lucas. For instance, public accommodations
laws establish a permanent public access easement that is justified without the
provision of compensation, 29 and depriving land of all of its economically
viable uses is constitutionally unremarkable when the only viable uses of that
land would produce significant public harm.3 o
A decade after Lucas, the Supreme Court expressed in no uncertain
terms its disinclination toward categorical rules in the takings context. In
2001 in Palazzolo v Rhode Island, the Court held that the fact that a claimant
purchased property after the regulation about which she was now complain-
ing was adopted did not preclude her takings claim per se; instead, the Court
explained that, on remand, the state court should use the Penn Central factors
to determine whether a taking had occurred. 31 Similarly, in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in 2002, the
Court rejected the claimant's position that a development moratorium auto-
matically should be deemed a compensable deprivation of all economically
viable uses regardless of any public interests served. 32 Tahoe-Sierra noted
that "[t]he Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all
the relevant circumstances" under the Penn Central "guideposts. 33
and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only
relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use
of the rest of his land"); see also Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Town of Ludlow, 762 A.2d 1219 (Vt.
2000) (concluding that the State's closure of a private road required takings compensation); Laura
S. Underkuffler, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 161, 184 85 (1996)
(suggesting that under an "operative" conception of property, "all property interests are not held
with the same intensity and are not equally protected").
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) (prohibiting discrimination and segregation in places of public
accommodation against individuals on the basis of their "race, color, religion, or national origin").
" Indeed, Lucas conceded as much. See 505 U.S. at 1029 (asserting that, in light of "back-
ground principles" of property law, the owner of a nuclear generating plant would "not be entitled
to compensation" when it is "directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault"). On the seemingly constrictive nature of Lucas'
discussion of "background principles," see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20
GEO. MASON L. REv. 837, 844 50 (2013); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public
Trust, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 369 71 (2009); Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, Water-
locked: Public Access to New Jersey's Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579, 596 98 (2007).
31 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). On remand, a Rhode Island trial court
judge rejected the landowner's regulatory takings claim because it was unreasonable for one to
expect to be able to fill and develop a saltwater pond and the adjacent marshlands. See Palazzolo
v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
32 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320 21
(2002).
" Id. at 327 n.23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S.
at 636).
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In terms of the Penn Central considerations themselves, takings prece-
dent on the "character of the governmental action" has revealed that regulato-
ry takings claims generally succeed only when the state cannot justify an im-
position that is "functionally equivalent" to the imposition sustained in an
ordinary exercise of the eminent domain power without providing compensa-
tion.34 It follows that claimants generally are not entitled to compensation for
abiding by democratically-enacted and generally applicable regulatory safe-
guards and obligations that (1) advance generalized public interests; 35 (2)
prevent owners from causing harm to others' person or property; 36 (3) estab-
lish baseline standards for social and market interactions by, for instance, pro-
tecting consumers from deceptive practices; 37 (4) mediate unavoidable con-
troversies; 38 and (5) endorse constitutional norms, such as anti-discrimination
and free speech. 39 Regulations are more likely to require compensation when
14 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
15 See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 10 (1927) (holding that setback requirements
do not constitute a taking); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 97 (1926)
(holding that a statutory building height limit did not result in a constitutional taking); Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 10748 (1909) (holding that a statutory building height limit did not result
in a constitutional taking and that the law fell within Massachusetts' police power).
36 See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 50042 (upholding a Pennsylvania regulation that limited
how much subsurface coal could be mined in order to protect surface structures); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 96 (1962) (upholding a town regulation that prohibited
excavation below the water table, which in turn rendered petitioner's quarry effectively useless);
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 325 (1920) (upholding a statute conditioning the
burning of natural gas); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409 11 (1915) (upholding a regu-
lation that banned the operation of brick factories within Los Angeles' city limits); Reinman v.
City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 77 (1915) (upholding a regulation banning livery stables
from certain areas in the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (upholding a
regulation that banned the production of alcohol for recreational purposes); Powell v. Common-
wealth, 7 A. 913, 915 17 (Pa. 1887) (upholding a law that outlawed the production of oleomarga-
rine).
17 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'nv. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 48 (1934) (upholding
the constitutionality of a state mortgage moratorium law, which allowed mortgagors to extend the
time period in which owners could pay their mortgages); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 58
(1921) (holding that a rent control law, which regulated rent prices and allowed tenants to stay in
their apartments so long as they paid on time and satisfied any other conditions of the lease, was
not a taking).
38 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529 30 (1992) (upholding a law that sets
mobile home rent prices and protects tenants' possession of mobile home pads in contravention of
the landlord's claim to possession); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 81 (1928) (upholding
the constitutionality of a state law that forced the destruction of petitioner's cedar trees that,
though themselves healthy, carried a fungus that would decimate nearby apple orchards).
'9 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 59 (1964) (hold-
ing that a federal anti-discrimination provision within the Civil Rights Act that prohibits racial
discrimination by hotels and other places of public accommodation was a valid exercise of Con-
gress' police power); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 350 51 (Cal. 1979) (up-
holding law promoting free speech on private property generally open to the public), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
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they (1) unjustifiably confiscate property that does not cause harm or interfere
with others' property rights; 40 (2) authorize third party occupation of privately
owned property that is not open to the public; 41 (3) single out individuals
among similarly situated persons to bear a wholly disproportionate weight of
an imposition; 42 or (4) retroactively diverge from what a reasonable owner
could have possibly expected when she invested in property and put that
property to a legitimate use in reliance on existing law.43
As for interference with the claimant's "reasonable investment-backed
expectations," precedent indicates that regulatory takings compensation usu-
ally is due only when an owner is disallowed from continuing a current use
that is not causing harm or posing a risk of harm.4 4 Takings law operates here
much like state land use regulations that protect investments in prior non-
conforming uses. Uncompensated changes in the applicable standards that
retroactively impede existing uses-which are quite rarely enacted-are gen-
erally deemed unfair absent substantial justification, whereas the more com-
mon uncompensated changes that impact prospective uses generally are not.
Finally, with respect to the "economic impact," Lucas suggests that a
regulation that deprives land of all of its economically viable uses requires
takings compensation if, absent the regulation, non-harmful, legally viable
uses of that land exist.45 Otherwise, though, economic impact of any signifi-
cance will not alone ordinarily give rise to takings liability.46 Only when the
economic impact is addressed in conjunction with one of the other considera-
tions does it-at least at times-take on meaning. 4 Where what might be
41 See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 68 (holding that the continued low-lying air flight of
United States Army bombers above the respondent's land constituted a taking); Pumpelly v. Green
Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 182 (1871) (holding that the flooding of petition-
er's land as a result of the state's decision to dam a river was a compensable taking).
41 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 80 (1979) (holding that gov-
ernment must invoke eminent domain and pay just compensation in order to turn a privately
owned dredged pond into a public aquatic park).
42 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 37-40 (2012) (holding
that the temporary nature of government-caused floods did not automatically preclude such floods
from constituting a taking); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 182.
4' KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 177 80.
44 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
45 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that, in accord with the
majority's holding, "[a] landowner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing,
while an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value").
46 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 645 (1993) (deeming 46% diminution in value "insufficient to demonstrate a taking"); Eu-
clid, 272 U.S. at 384 (finding 75% diminution resulting from a zoning scheme constitutionally
sound); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405 (rejecting a claim that 92.5% diminution in value resulting
from a new restriction on the operation of brickyards necessitated compensation).
47 See Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 736 ("[T]he showing of a landowner's loss-even a
significant loss-[is not] sufficient, of itself, to compel compensation.").
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deemed a vested right-such as one akin to a prior non-conforming use-is at
stake, a substantial economic impact resulting from a new regulation could
potentially be considered unfair. Merely acquiring vacant land, though, does
not give rise to a vested right, such that regulatory safeguards enacted post-
acquisition that prevent some land uses ordinarily are considered to result
merely in a lost opportunity that is non-compensable. 48 In most takings cases,
though, the economic impact actually is of little import. Regulations that sin-
gle out specific owners might not produce a large economic impact but none-
theless amount to takings if the singling out is unjustified absent compensa-
tion. Conversely, regulations that do not single out owners might produce a
large economic impact yet not raise takings concerns. 49
The foregoing summary suggests that the usual driver in a modem regu-
latory takings suit is not, as Justice Holmes initially suggested, the "degree of
diminution in value"-as calculated by accounting for the economic burdens
and benefits of the alleged expropriatory act from the claimant's perspec-
tive-or the claimant's asserted expectation to use her land for some purpose
in the future, but rather the "specificity" and the "character" of the state's de-
cision. 50 The courts repeatedly have asserted that determining whether the
48 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135 36 (stating that the regulation in question will not affect the
uses to which petitioner had put its property in the sixty-five years prior to the case); Euclid, 272
U.S. at 384 (noting that the parcel of land in question had been vacant for years).
49 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
the "risks of... singling out are of central concern in takings law"); William C. Haas & Co. v.
City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a takings claim where a
height restriction in San Francisco reduced the value of lots from $2 million to $100,000 because
it applied to the entire Russian Hill neighborhood); James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empiri-
cal Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35, 67 (2016) (demonstrating that eco-
nomic diminution in value by itself is almost never enough to support a takings claim). But see
Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REv. 122, 167-68 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should abdicate the current takings jurisprudence that concentrates on the singling out of
claimants).
51 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067, 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This position, emphasized in Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent in Lucas, more recently has been embodied as a principal feature of the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence. In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens himself authored an opinion for a
six-Justice majority rejecting a takings claim based on a 32-month moratorium in development on
Lake Tahoe's shores on the view that a tempomry-as opposed to a permanent ban on develop-
ment poses "a lesser risk that individuals will be 'singled out' to bear a special burden that should be
shared by the public as a whole." Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332, 336, 341 (recognizing that takings
law is designed to "protect[] individual property owners from bearing public burdens 'which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"' and asserting that "we have es-
chewed 'any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons"' (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49)) (internal quotations omitted);
see also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 109 (Cal. 2002) (asserting that
reciprocity of advantage lies "not in a precise balance of burdens and benefits accruing to property
from a single law, or in an exact equality of burdens among all property owners, but in the interlock-
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imposition resulting from an adjustment to a property interest is unfair and
unjust without the provision of compensation cannot be accomplished
through the application of a mechanical formula. Rather, this task requires
contextualized value judgments on a range of issues, including when rights
vest (on purchase, upon applying for or receipt of a development permit, only
after substantial construction, etc.), what constitutes harm, what minimum
standards are consistent with a free and fair market, and what is the content of
our constitutional norms and the manner and extent to which they unify our
system of common, statutory, and administrative laws.5 ' Judgments on these
types of variables serve as regulatory takings law's limiting principles. If, on
these terms, the imposition associated with a state regulatory decision is un-
fair and unjust without compensation, it is compensable; if it is not, the impo-
sition is more appropriately conceived as a responsibility, not a burden, of
ownership.
At bottom, then, regulatory takings law offers space not to routinely
provide compensation to parties economically impacted by adjustments in
property laws, but, rather-sharing the words of Rainer Forst-to vindicate
impacted parties' "right to justification" regarding the fairness of the respon-
sibilities compelled by those adjustments.52 On this view, takings law does
not inhibit democracy by constraining those collective adjustments to proper-
ty laws that produce diminutions in economic value. Instead, takings law
helps to guide adjustments to property laws in ways that maintain property's
character as a healthy, fair, and just democratic institution. The next section
illustrates by way of example how takings law ordinarily has served in this
role to date.
ing system of benefits, economic and noneconomic, that all the participants in a democratic society
may expect to receive, each also being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some advantage,
economic or noneconomic, for the common good").
51 The necessity of taking a normative stance in defining and enforcing property laws is clear-
ly exemplified when one considers whether a person who murders her joint tenant holds title to the
property the two had held jointly by right of survivorship. See Singer, supra note 25, at 657.
52 See RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEO-
RY OF JUSTICE 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012). Forst explains:
The fundamental impulse that runs counter to injustice is not primarily that of want-
ing to have or have more of something, but that of wanting to no longer be op-
pressed, harassed, or have one's claims and basic right to justification ignored. This
right expresses the demand that there be no political or social relations of govern-
ance that cannot be adequately justified to those affected by them.
Id; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 265 ("Good reasoning is often stimulated when law-
makers take the time to explain why they did what they did and why they thought a decision best
served the public interest.").
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B. Regulatory Takings Law in Application
1. Enactment and Enforcement
Most regulatory takings cases surround allocative choices made by the
state through the enactment and enforcement of a regulatory safeguard or
obligation affecting the use or transfer of the claimant s land.53 In the usual
case, these types of regulations easily survive application of the Penn Central
considerations as outlined above, for the ordinary workings of democracy
usually produce laws that adjust property interests in ways that do not impose
especially unfair and unjust impositions. Select instances, though, pose closer
calls. For a comparative example, consider two approaches to serving the
public interest at issue in Penn Central itself: historic preservation.
Many municipalities have formally identified certain neighborhoods as
composed of structures that are of architectural or other historic signifi-
cance. 54 Structures within these districts regularly are subject to design guide-
lines that provide a check on construction activities to assure that they do not
unduly interfere with the neighborhood's historic integrity. The guidelines,
then, restrict the freedom of the owners of structures within that district to
redevelop their land as they please. Governmental entities often justify this
imposition without compensation on the ground that, as with traditional zon-
ing schemes, setback requirements, and floor-area ratios, these owners are
reciprocally benefitted by the district designation. Although the government
certainly should foresee that its decision to designate a neighborhood as his-
toric would present an imposition on those who own property within that dis-
trict, all of those owners not only experience that imposition, but also simul-
taneously enjoy the aesthetic and economic fruits of knowing that their
neighbors are subject to the same. Any alleged imposition is purely economic
in nature and rarely of great severity, for the design restrictions allow current
uses to continue and usually apply only to a structure's exterior. Indeed, ac-
cording to some studies, properties may be more economically valuable fol-
lowing the designation of their neighborhood as historic than they were prior
to the designation. 55 Moreover, the distribution of the imposition is wide-
spread across all properties within the district. Finally, given that thousands of
neighborhoods in the United States have been designated historic over the
53 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 15 ("In the hypothetical dispute widely viewed as the
norm, an individual landowner desires to engage in a particular land use, only to be frustrated by
an overbearing regulatory agency.").
5 E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107 08 (citing examples of historic preservation ordinanc-
es).
55 See, e.g., Donovan D. Rypkema, The (Economic) Value of National Register Listing, CUL-
TURAL RES. MGMT, no. 1, 2002, at 6.
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past eighty years, 56 it would be unreasonable for an owner within a neigh-
borhood of any vintage not to have foreseen this possibility. The mere pur-
chase of land should not give rise to a vested immunity from any regulation
at all.57 For these reasons, constitutional takings challenges to historic district
581designations have found little success.
Distinct from the designation of historic districts are those historic des-
ignations of a lone structure within a community, particularly where the struc-
ture was built in the same era as, and in an architectural style similar to, myri-
ad other buildings within the community. 59 Perhaps, for instance, a locality
wants to preserve some piece of its history while facilitating modernized con-
struction. Seeking to preserve ties to a town's historical roots is almost uni-
versally considered a permissible public objective. However, takings law is
concerned with the issue of whether a local government is justified in impos-
ing this singular historic designation on the claimant's property without com-
pensation.
A local government may have more difficulty justifying the imposition
experienced by this single owner without compensation than it would in justi-
fying the more generally applicable impacts of creating a historic district. 6In
choosing to pursue the public end of preserving some piece of its history
while still facilitating modem construction in the surrounding area, the impo-
sition on a single property owner is acutely debilitating and presents less re-
ciprocal advantage than a historic district designation. The government is well
aware that an individualized landmark designation in these circumstances can
51 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107 (noting that "all 50 states and over 500 municipalities have
enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of... areas with historic ... importance).
57 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 396 97 (holding that the owner of a vacant parcel of land is not
entitled to enjoin the local government from enforcing any part of a zoning ordinance with respect
to such parcel).
58 See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws After
Penn Central, 15 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 313, 332 34 (2004). Some jurisdictions have limited
by legislation the designation of neighborhoods as historic absent the consent of the owners within
those neighborhoods or the payment of compensation if such regulation creates an economic dim-
inution of value. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1134 (2017).
59 See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 888 (1996) (finding a com-
pensable taking where the state refused to issue a certificate of appropriateness to a monastery
seeking to demolish one of its buildings).
'o Indeed, debate on this point is what made the Supreme Court's seminal regulatory takings
decision in Penn Central so contentious. Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132 (explaining that
New York City's Landmarks Law "embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic
or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city"), with id. at 138 39 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York, appellees
have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks .... [The owner of one of these desig-
nated landmarks might find] that the landmark designation imposes upon him a substantial cost,
with little or no offsetting benefit except for the honor of the designation.").
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produce a negative imposition on the designation's target, and it may well be
unfair to expect an owner to have anticipated that one's own building will be
subject to historic design guidelines when similarly situated owners are not.
At the same time, the imposition may not be particularly severe-it is likely
only economic in nature,6 1 the owner's current use may continue (such that
only a potential opportunity is lost), the limitations apply only to the struc-
ture's exterior, and the land and structure remain marketable.
This discussion is not intended to suggest that historic landmark desig-
nations regularly should be deemed takings; indeed, the courts have reasona-
bly concluded in many instances-including Penn Central-that they should
62not. Rather, this comparative example is offered to illustrate that, compared
to the case of the government's delineating an entire district historic, an iso-
lated historic landmark designation may present a greater likelihood that the
quality and concentration of the imposition stemming from that landmark
designation may be unfair and unjust absent compensation.6 3 The key point,
however, is that in either instance-whether the takings claim is based on the
enactment and enforcement of a generalized historic districting scheme or a
more specific landmark designation-the courts will entertain and analyze on
the merits whether such a new regulatory safeguard restricting the use of the
claimant s land produces an imposition that triggers takings law's compensa-
tion remedy.64 As intimated at the outset of this Article and explained in more
detail in the following section, though, the same cannot be said in the context
of those impositions arising from the government's non-enforcement of an
existing regulatory safeguard (or obligation) against other property owners.
2. Enactment and Non-Enforcement
It is the predominant view among state and lower federal courts that
non-enforcement of an existing regulation against other property owners can-
not serve as the basis for a takings claim under any circumstances. The Texas
6 It is not outside the realm of possibility, however, that such a situation also might impose
dignity costs, for serving as the town's sacrificial lamb may be especially humiliating.
62 See Byrne, supra note 58, at 334.
63 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY 180 82 (2012). For a similar analysis comparing generally applicable agricul-
tural zoning districts to "an agricultural zoning law [that] affects only one farm in the communi-
ty," see John Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,471, 10,484
(2009).
64 See, e.g., Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 888 (finding a compensable taking where the state refused
to issue a certificate of appropriateness to a monastery seeking to demolish one of its buildings,
even though the state issued certificates of appropriateness to similar buildings in the area).
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Supreme Court most recently asserted this majority position in the matter of
Harris County v Kerr in 2016.65
The dispute in Harris County involved more than four hundred down-
stream residents of Texas's Upper White Oak Bayou whose homes were con-
structed in the 1970s and early 1980s. 66 In 1984, the County adopted a fully
formulated flood control plan that promised to protect against the one hun-
dred-year flood in those already-developed areas and maintain one hundred-
year flood protection in those areas anticipated for future development.67 Yet
the County approved a wealth of new upstream development in contravention
of the mitigating conditions set out in the plan.68 When the downstream lands
flooded by an event much less severe than the one hundred-year flood, resi-
dents of these flooded lands filed suit alleging that the County had unconstitu-
tionally taken their property by failing to implement its flood control plan.69
15 Harris Cry. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 SW.3d 793 (Tex. 2016). Various other cases
align with Harris County's rejection of takings claims grounded in government nonfeasance. See,
e.g., Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The [government's] failure to
[enforce the regulation in question] successfully does not ... constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment."); Valles v. Pima County, 776 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2011) (asserting that
"[pIlaintiffs have not cited any authority to suggest that a government's inaction or omissions can
amount to a taking, and this Court is not aware of any such case law"); Griffin Broadband
Commc'ns, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 320, 324 (2007) ("[T]he Government's failure to
prevent [an alleged injury] properly is characterized as inaction, and so cannot constitute a tak-
ing."); Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 620 (2007) (declaring that "[i]n no case that
we know of has a governmental agency's failure to act ... been ruled a taking[,]" and that
'Ju]nder the decisions controlling this Court, omissions or claims that the Government should
have done more to protect the public do not form the basis of a valid takings claim"); Woods v.
Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. BACV200700099A, 2011 WL 7788022, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2011) (dismissing a takings claim summarily where the State was apparently aware that the
claimant's neighbor violated the terms of a shoreline armoring permit, and the claimant alleged
that her land was destroyed as a result of the State not moving to enforce that permit, despite con-
tradictorily asserting that the State's argument that "its decision not to take discretionary action as
to enforcement of a condition in a license cannot form the basis of a takings action" was "unsup-
ported by law"); Bargmann v. State, 600 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Neb. 1999) (rejecting takings claim
where the State allowed obstructions on a highway that injured the claimant's property on the
ground that the obstructions were constructed and maintained by private third parties with "no
direct involvement" by the State); Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2004) ("To establish an inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must show ... an affirmative,
positive, aggressive act on the part of the government agency .... ); Grunwald v. City of Castle
Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App. 2002) (rejecting the notion that non-enforement of a con-
dition in the claimants' neighbor's building permit that resulted in a marked reduction in the
claimants' use and enjoyment of their property could give rise to takings liability by asserting only
that "[w]e have found no authority holding [that] ... a failure to act results in a regulatory tak-
ing").
66 499 S.W.3d at 795 96.
67 Id. at 796
68 Id. at 796 97.
61 Id. at 795, 797.
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In the summer of 2016, Texas's highest court dismissed, in a series of
terse sentences, the prospect of any form of government non-enforcement
serving as the basis for a takings claim. The court stated that "[w]e have not
recognized a takings claim for nonfeasance," "the law does not recognize
takings liability for a failure to complete the [flood control plan]," and "inac-
tion cannot give rise to a taking., 70 The court's only attempt at supporting
these assertions came in the form of self-serving textualist inferences; for ex-
ample, it pointed to state takings precedents referring to an "affirmative 'act'
or 'action,"' a "specific act," and an "intentional act" as evidence that non-
enforcement cannot give rise to takings liability.7' In effect, then, the court
was operating under the assumption that the state was not sufficiently in-
volved to even consider whether it bore some responsibility for the impacts of
the downstream flooding. The court only addressed the substance of the
downstream owners' claim asserting, as the court described it, that the Coun-
ty's "doing nothing more than allowing [specific upstream] private parties to
use their [own] properties as they wish" amounted to a taking of downstream
properties, and it did not consider the extent to which the County was allow-
ing these specific upstream parties to use someone else s property by causing
certain downstream properties harm.72
The court easily dismissed this claim on the ground that the County's
decision to permit private development did not make it liable for the later
downstream flooding that such development caused to specific parcels that
the County did not intend to inundate .7 A decision to the contrary, said the
court, would bring government functioning to a halt, for it would saddle the
government with liability not only in those instances where it has "designs on
a particular plaintiff's property[,]" but also where it merely knows that
"somewhere, someday, its routine governmental operations will likely cause
damage to some as yet unidentified private property., 74 According to the
court, recognizing liability for the mere approval of private development
would have major reverberations across all manner of government services,
71 Id. at 800, 805. Ironically, these statements sat alongside the court's grand if unsupported
assertions that "strong judicial protection for individual property rights is essential to 'freedom
itself,"' preserving property rights is-quoting John Locke the "'great and chief end' of gov-
ernment," property rights are "a foundational liberty, not a contingent privilege," and property
rights are "fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, .... not derived from the legislature" and
"preexist[] even constitutions." Id. at 804 (footnotes omitted).
71 Id. at 800.
72 See id. at 804. Some have interpreted the decision in Phillips v. King County as holding that
the state generally has no duty to insulate owners from the effects of neighboring development.
See Krier & Sterk, supra note 49, at 72 (citing Phillips v. King County, 968 P.2d 871, 878 (Wash.
1998)).
71 Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 807.
74 Id. at 808.
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from utilities to school transportation to roadway access.75 The government
would have to pay takings compensation every time property is damaged
from a toppled electrical pole, for it knows that properties near the poles are
76
especially vulnerable to such events. It would have to pay takings compen-
sation for property damage resulting from many school bus accidents, for it
knows that, in operating school buses, the risk of collisions is more likely in
those locations where bus traffic is concentrated.77 And it would have to pay
takings compensation for property damage resulting from the many other ac-
cidents that stem from approving driveway access to state roads, for it knows
that increases in access density increase collision rates.78 In sum, by assuming
that non-enforcement of existing regulatory safeguards and obligations is not
an exercise of state power that should be conceived of as capable of depriving
private property, a majority of the justices on the Texas Supreme Court
deemed Harris County a relatively uncomplicated case.
This Part has suggested that regulatory takings law is best understood as
offering some assurance that property adjustments will be fairly and justly
administered so as not to produce targeted or specialized impositions that dis-
respect the same interests and values that the institution of property is intend-
ed to serve. However, it highlights how this assurance has been deemed rele-
vant only in those instances where adjustments to property interests occur via
the enactment and anticipated enforcement of regulatory safeguards and obli-
gations, and not to the non-enforcement of those regulations that already ex-
ist. The following Part questions this state of affairs by suggesting that non-
enforcement, like enactment and enforcement, reflects an allocative decision
by the state.
75 Id. at 808 09. The court gave a fourth example that, even on the court's approach to the
case, seems inapposite. The court expressed concern that the government would be liable for a
taking when it approved a high-rise development when it knew it did not have the equipment to
put out a fire on the building's upper floors and a fire on those upper floors ultimately damaged
adjacent properties. Id. at 809 10. It is not evident, though, that approving a high-rise develop-
ment when it knew it did not have the equipment-or, alternatively, an arrangement with a nearby
town to put out a fire on the building's upper floors would be a reasonable decision on any plau-
sible substantive grounds. But see id. at 809 (suggesting that such a decision could be reasonable
"given [the government's] tax base or funding priorities").
76 Id. at 808.
77 Id. at 809.
78 id.
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II. CONCEIVING OF NON-ENFORCEMENT AS A TOOL
TO ALLOCATE PROPERTY INTERESTS
Harris County v. Kerr mirrors a general judicial aversion to reviewing
non-enforcement decisions in a number of other areas of law, including writs
of mandamus,7 9 criminal indictments, 0 and administrative law."l Perhaps
most akin to Harris County in this regard is the U.S. Supreme Court's 1985
decision in Heckler v Chaney, which interpreted the Administrative Proce-
dure Act to include a "presumption of unreviewability" of federal agency de-
cisions to decline enforcement action in response to citizen requests. Similar
to how the Heckler Court rested its holding on the supposition that non-
enforcement rarely leads to direct government encroachment on private prop-
erty rights, 2 the predominant view categorically opposing non-enforcement
takings liability set out in Harris County operates on the premise that non-
enforcement of law is not an exercise of state power capable of depriving in-
dividuals of property.
3
This Part advances the alternative perspective by contending that the
state should be understood as exercising its power in the property sphere both
when it is deciding whether to enact a regulatory safeguard or obligation and
when it is deciding whether to enforce an existing one, for resolving any
property dispute necessarily involves the state making an allocative choice to
79 The circumstances in which a court will order what is often referred to as the "extraordi-
nary" writ of mandamus to compel enforcement of, for example, permitting programs and other
local land use laws, are quite narrow. The writ, though, has not been abolished. Although the spe-
cific requirements vary by state, a party seeking a mandamus order generally must prove: (1) a
"clearly-established legal right" to the government action requested, see, e.g., In re T.H.T., 665
S.E.2d 54, 59 (N.C. 2008); (2) it "is not reasonably debatable" that the defendant has an obligation
to perform the action requested; see, e.g., Kennedy v. Bldg. Inspector of Randolph, 222 N.E.2d
860, 862 (Mass. 1967); In re T.H.T., 665 S.E.2d at 59; (3) fulfillment of this obligation is not
discretionary, see, e.g., Bois v. City of Manchester, 177 A.2d 612, 615 (N.H. 1962); Cooney v.
Town of Wilmington Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 33 N.Y.S.3d 547, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); (4)
the defendant has refused to perform the action requested within the allowable time period, see,
e.g., Vill. on the Hill, Inc. v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 202 N.E.2d 602, 611 12 (Mass. 1964); and
(5) there is no alternative, adequate legal remedy available. See, e.g., Flynn v. Town of Seekonk,
223 N.E.2d 690, 691 92 (Mass. 1967); In re Fairchild, 616 A.2d 228, 231 (Vt. 1992). In some
jurisdictions, though, an alternative remedy need not be pursued when it would have been futile to
do so. See, e.g., Mullenv. Ippolito Corp., 50 A.3d 673, 684 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
" Such an aversion is perhaps best illustrated by surveying the very limited types of excep-
tions. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 33 (1984) (deeming retaliatory prosecutions
impermissible); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 29 (1974) (holding that potentially spiteful
exercises of prosecutorial discretion are reviewable for illegitimacy); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 261-63 (1971) (concluding that prosecutors cannot induce guilty pleas based on promis-
es they do not keep).
8 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 38 (1985).
82 Id. at 831.
83 See supra notes 65 78 and accompanying text.
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assign an interest to one party and not to another. The Part surveys a range of
enforcement-related decisions by which the state allocates property interests
before ultimately suggesting that non-enforcement decisions, like enactment
and enforcement decisions, should be subject to takings review to assure
those decisions impose responsibilities that are fair and just absent compen-
sation.
Section A contends that the state not only can allocate property interests
through the direct route of deciding to adopt and enforce new regulatory safe-
guards and obligations, but also through the indirect route of deciding not to
adopt those regulations, as exemplified through the lens of the well-known
dispute between the owner of an apple orchard and the owner of a cedar tree
farm at issue in the 1928 Supreme Court case of Miller v. Schoene. 4 Section
B draws on two examples-Iowa's "right-to-farm" statute and Oregon's
Measure 37-to illustrate that the state also can allocate property interests
through the enactment of regulations but then formally decide not to enforce
those regulations in certain instances.8 5 Section C returns to and reframes the
conflict in Harris County to illuminate the extent to which a less formalized
governmental decision not to enforce an existing property regulation also
serves an allocative function. 6 Section D synthesizes the preceding three sec-
tions to suggest that takings law should police allocations resulting from non-
enforcement decisions on the same "fairness and justice" grounds that it po-
lices allocations resulting from the enactment and enforcement of new regula-
817tions .
A. Allocating Property Interests Through Decisions
Not to Enact Regulations
Though vigorous debate persists regarding the manner and extent to
which the government must be involved for its conduct to be considered
"state action," the government's involvement in some way is generally con-
sidered a threshold requirement for finding a constitutional violation."" Nev-
ertheless, a number of constitutional scholars have drawn upon the "state ac-
14 See infra notes 88 115 and accompanying text.85 See infra notes 116 144 and accompanying text.
86 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 146 165 and accompanying text.
88 One of the Supreme Court's more famous and expansive interpretations of the state action
doctrine is set out in Shelley v. Kraemer, where the Court held that the decision of a state court to
enforce a private agreement restricting "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race" from occupying
a parcel of land amounted to state action. 334 U.S. 1, 21 23 (1948). Shelley, either as the subject
of effusive praise or biting critique, features prominently in the scholarly dialogue on the contours
of "state action."
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tion" requirement to distinguish not only governmental from non-govern-
mental conduct, but also to differentiate between governmental action and
governmental inaction. On this view, only governmental action-not gov-
ernmental inaction-implicates the Constitution.
This latter interpretation of the "state action" requirement as differentiat-
ing between governmental action and governmental inaction supports the po-
sition that the Constitution provides only "negative fights."89 Understanding
constitutional fights as purely negative suggests that such rights only impose
on the government a duty to avoid affirmative actions that can impose certain
harms (such as interfering with one's free exercise of her religion), and not
affirmative obligations to confer benefits or respond to needs (such as provid-
ing welfare assistance). 90 To treat property as a negative constitutional Fight
89 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 112 (1985) (contending that "[t]he sole function of the police power is to protect
individual liberty and private property against all manifestations of force and fraud"). In an opin-
ion authored by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described the Consti-
tution as "a charter of negative rather than positive liberties." Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). The court continued, "The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them." Id. Similarly, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, then-Justice Rehnquist asserted that the purpose of the
Constitution is "to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them
from each other." 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) The Deshaney Court ultimately held that the state's
creating a system directing citizens to depend on local state agencies to protect children from
abuse did not support a child's due process claim for loss of liberty where one of those agencies
failed to prevent that child's abuse by a custodial parent. Id. at 201-03. Most all discussions that
delineate rights requiring state action as "positive" and rights protecting individuals from state
action as "negative" rest, if implicitly, on the foundation laid by Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 191
(Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998). The argument offered here
that property is not appropriately considered a positive right such that the state action doctrine is
of little meaning in the property context does not broach the overall wisdom of the state action
doctrine outside this context. Nevertheless, this Article admittedly lends implicit support for the
view that cases setting out broad interpretations of what constitutes "state action" for Equal Pro-
tection purposes such as the Supreme Court's classifying as state action the judicial enforcement
of a racially restrictive covenant in Shelley should be considered more important components of
this area of constitutional jurisprudence than they often are. On advocating such a place for Shel-
ley, see Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph William Singer, Things Invisible to See: State Action and
Private Property, TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author).
90 David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the
Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 415 16 (1996) ("From a Jeffersonian perspective, the
essential purpose of the Constitution is not to empower government but to restrain it .... "); Eliza-
beth Pascal, Welf re Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 868-69 (2008) ("It is an
accepted principle of constitutional law that the Federal Constitution contains only negative
rights."); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect Property,
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2014) ("[T]oday most courts and commentators agree with the de-
scriptive claim that the federal Constitution protects only negative liberties."); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of
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is, it seems, to support the idea that the protection of property is the "key-
stone" to self-governance for two principal reasons: it creates stability in ma-
terial wealth to promote economic investments 91 and it guards individual
freedoms from the tyranny of government power.92 On this view, property
describes what interests people have, and the Takings Clause protects the in-
dividual negative right to the government's non-interference with those indi-
vidual interests. 93 Certainly social and economic regulations adopted through
the political process will impact property holdings to some extent, but the
distinction between protection against government interference and govern-
ment obligations to interfere cannot be obscured. 94 The former is superior to
the latter in nearly all respects.
This non-interference/interference dichotomy might serve as a useful
framing device in some circumstances outside the property context. Many
individual constitutional rights, like free speech, can be considered public
goods in the sense that, once such a good is produced, consumption by one
person generally does not detract from consumption by others and no one can
be easily prevented from enjoying it. Such constitutional public goods thus
generally can be protected against government interference and exist inde-
pendently.95 As one prominent constitutional scholar describes it, "upon
Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1985) ("In our constitutional system, rights tend to be
individual, alienable, and negative.") (emphasis added). Professor Serkin suggests that passive
takings liability is politically plausible because, unlike positive rights that have been advocated in
the past, such as welfare and abortion, employing the Takings Clause to protect property claims in
creative ways has long been a "favorite of conservatives." Serkin, supra, at 360. The modem con-
servative turn to the Takings Clause as a mechanism to protect against government action regard-
ing the distribution of resources is generally attributed to Richard Epstein. See generally EPSTEIN,
supra note 89. Professor Epstein asserts, for instance, that the Takings Clause should be interpret-
ed to constrain the enactment of zoning codes, workers' compensation laws, and progressive in-
come taxes. See id. at 103, 247 51, 295 303.
91 This view rests on two key, related assumptions: (1) property initially was justly distributed
in accordance with values that remain and will forever remain in force, and (2) most subsequent
transfers have been voluntary. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150 55
(1974) (discussing the "historical principles of justice" that make holdings or distributions of hold-
ings just).
92 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing how the framers of the Constitution
"saw property ownership as a buffer protecting individuals from government coercion"); see also
Carol M. Rose, PropertyAs The Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333 (1996) (ex-
plaining that Ely and other scholars view property rights as the foundation of all other rights in
society).
9' See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97 103 (1977)
(describing this view of property as the "ordinary understanding" of property).
94 Laura S. Underkuffler, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1042
(1996).
9' See Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights "Trump?" An Examination of Speech and
Property, 52 ME. L. REV. 311, 316 17 (2000).
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granting one person the ight to speak, there is no necessary taking of that
same right from another.",
96
The idea that property rights are akin to these other individual constitu-
tional rights in providing a barrier of protection against the government's
wishes is a prominent and powerful one in the American psyche. 97 Neverthe-
less, property rights are, in actuality, distinct from all other individual consti-
tutional rights in important respects. Unlike the subjects of these other
rights-such as speech, association, religious exercise, equal protection, and
due process-the resources to which property is directed are finite and, at
least in some ways, cannot be shared. 98 If the state allocates to one party a
right to control the use of land or to mine subsurface resources, it denies that
right and those attendant to it to all others.
Property rights' rivalrous nature suggests that it is not possible within the
realm of property to distinguish between protection against government inter-
ference and government obligations to interfere. 99 Property is not a public
good, at least in the terms described here. There is no right-indeed, no
way-to be left alone when it comes to property. Unlike recognizing a per-
son's claim to speak freely, the state's recognizing one person's claim to a
limited, non-shareable resource does necessarily detract from consumption by
others. That is, although the government's non-interference with one's right to
9' Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1039.
97 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 250 (1990) (arguing that the belief that "property rights bear a special relation to liber-
ty" is a "psychological experience"); Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 731 (suggesting that "all of
us, on some level, believe" in the idea of "property as protection"). Kevin Gray suggests that
lawmakers often perpetuate this mythical idea of "property as protection" by obscuring the reality
of property's contingent nature. Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, in 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROB-
LEMS 157, 159 (M.D.A. Freeman & R. Halson eds., 1994) ("[P]roperty is not theft but fraud.").
98 See, e.g., Morris Cohem Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13 (1928); Under-
kuffler, supra note 94, at 1039; see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving
Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 349, 360 n.47 (2014).
99 Property is, in this way, paradoxical: Many Americans have a deep personal feeling that
property should be very strongly protected, but there is no way that it can be. See Jennifer
Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in
PROPERTY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 427 (G.E. van Maanen & AJ van der
Walt eds., 1996) ("[P]roperty implicates the core issues of politics: distributive justice and the
allocation of power."); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two
Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006) ("When owners prove unwilling or
unable to sort out disagreements about ... spillover effects on their own, the state [has] to make
decisions about which spillover effects owners must tolerate and which spillover-creating actions
they may not take."); Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 363, 370 (2010) ("No societally recognized and enforced property right, which is
'normatively neutral,' actually exists."). But see Eric Claeys, Kelo, The Castle, and Natural Prop-
erty Rights, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 47
(Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) ("In all but the most extreme cases, ... the natural law refrains
from picking and choosing among owners or land uses.").
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free speech generally does not implicate another's right to free speech,' 00 the
government's non-interference with one's claim to property necessarily inter-
feres with another's claim to the same. "'
It follows that the non-interference/interference dichotomy and the at-
tendant vocabulary of "negative rights" thus cannot describe property protec-
tion, for such protection involves the resolution of competing claims. Indeed,
it is impossible for the state to avoid making a deliberative choice in most any
property dispute. For instance, whether the state undertakes construction of a
revetment that alters the flow of water and results in the destruction of neigh-
boring land, authorizes a private party to do the same (either via a formal
permit or by choosing not to prohibit it), or fails to enforce a permit or order
to a private party that putatively prohibits it, the state cannot extract itself
from making an allocative choice about whether the affected neighboring
landowner's interest includes security against such a substantial harm. 0 2 Un-
dertakings, permissions, and prohibitions are answers to the question of
whether the neighboring landowner's claim to security is valid; simultaneous-
ly, they are answers to the question of whether the builder's interest includes
the freedom to rely on a revetment of this sort to protect her land. Undertak-
ings, permissions, and prohibitions all produce property allocations, and they
all, therefore, constitute available property laws.
It is not only the allocative nature of property that sets it apart from other
constitutional rights, but also the content of what is being allocated. Property
allocates to individuals interests in resources to the exclusion of others that, at
a threshold level, are necessary for human existence. 103 Other constitutional
rights are of limited import if one does not have access to the minimum
"' There surely are very important exceptions. For example, to the extent hate-speech silenc-
es its targets, the government's non-interference with one's claim to free speech for instance, a
newspaper's desire to publish hate speech-does interfere with another's claim to the same. See,
e.g., Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law'sResponse to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 30 (1987).
"' See Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINA-
BILITY 43, 50 (David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011) (explaining that, in such an instance,
"[piroperty rights [do] not increase overall: they [are] simply reconfigured").
102 See Saidel-Goley & Singer, supra note 89 (manuscript at 72) ("Either an owner has the
right to eject a homeless person from his property or the homeless person has a right to enter the
property to save his life. The state cannot fail to act in cases like this; it must allocate the entitlement
to someone and deny it to others; there is simply no space within which the state can be said to not
be acting."). But see Woods v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. BACV200700099A, 2011 WL
7788022, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2011) (holding that the State's non-enforcement of condi-
tions to permits issued to the claimants' neighbors that allow them to build revetments, which
allegedly led to destructive erosion on the claimants' property, is a dispute viewed best as between
two private parties rather than one that the State necessarily must resolve).
103 See, e.g., Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1039-40.
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threshold of resources to subsist.' 04 The government must therefore inevitably
not only make choices as to who gets what, but also, taken to its logical end,
determine whether some will subsist and others will not.
These charactefistics of property-its allocative nature and its link to
human survival-put pressure on the popular "negative fights" notion that the
Constitution provides expansive protection against government interference
with individual property fights. In one limited sense, the exercise of all indi-
vidual constitutional rights requires the creation and funding of a state infra-
structure to facilitate enforcement, such that all rights, including property
rights, are "positive fights."' 1 5 However, property rights are positive rights in
a much larger sense. When the state chooses to protect the property claim of
an individual to a resource-which, in some instances, is a resource essential
for that individual to subsist-it is necessarily choosing to reject the property
claims of other individuals to the same.
These types of state choices must be made, then, with social goals in
mind. 106 In the words of one prominent property theorist, "[t]here is, in truth,
no morally neutral place for [property law] to hide."' 1 7 With regard to any
actual or conceived property dispute, democratic lawmakers cannot simply
seek to identify the claimed entitlements or expectations of the parties. Ra-
104 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 676 77; Rose, supra note 92, at 362 63.
105 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Positive Rights, the Constitution, and Conservatives and Mod-
erate Libertarians, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/05/07/
positive-rights-the-consitution-and-conservatives-and-moderate-libertarians/ [https://perma.cc/
QA3Q-GS5A] (stating simultaneously that "[m]y property rights in my land are a negative consti-
tutional right against the government" and that "property consist[s] of... a positive right against
the government to protect your property via the court system and the police").
106 See C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITI-
CAL POSITIONS 1, 11 12 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (asserting that property "is not thought to
be a right because it is an enforceable claim: it is an enforceable claim because it is thought to be a
human right," such that "if it is not so justified, it does not for long remain an enforceable claim");
see also Andrd van der Walt, Property Theory and the Transformation of Property Law, in MOD-
ERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 376 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2005) (arguing that "a transform-
ative property theory has to be a normative theory that justifies the balance between stability and
change, in every individual context, on consideration of human values"); Hanoch Dagan, The
Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1519 20 (2003) (characterizing decision-making about
maintaining or reforming property institutions as a normative process informed by human values);
Saidel-Goley & Singer, supra note 89 (manuscript at 69) (explaining that property law is "replete
with [equitable] doctrines that promote justice" some based on reliance (such as easements by
estoppel), others on relationships (such as equitable distribution of property upon divorce), and
still others on antidiscrimination principles (for instance, laws extending access to housing without
regard to race, sex, gender, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or disability)through a
"method of balancing [that] is not neutral or disinterested").
10' See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 84 (2010); see
also Underkuffler, supra note 28, at 201 (arguing that "[n]o model of property avoids value
choice[s]").
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ther, they must ask what values recognizing those competing claims serve and
explore the reasons why our society might wish to preserve or advance-or,
contrarily, renounce or suppress-those values. It is not possible to protect the
claimed entitlements or expectations of everyone. Property is not impartial;
instead, it necessarily is partial. In the face of an adjudication of competing
claims within a particular social context, at least one side undoubtedly will be
disappointed. '08
The well-known case of Miller v Schoene highlights the point. 109 Miller
posed the question of whether the state's ordering the claimant, by statute, to
destroy cedar trees on his own land to prevent them from spreading cedar rust
to the detriment of apple trees on neighboring land unconstitutionally de-
prived the claimant of property."10 The Supreme Court rejected the claim,
concluding that the state "[did] not exceed its constitutional powers by decid-
ing upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.""'
The Court explained:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by
doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards
within its borders to go unchecked. "1
2
The decision in Miller, as exemplified in the excerpts quoted above, is at
once remarkable and routine. The decision is remarkable to the extent the
Court strongly implied that the case presented a rather unique situation in
which the state was pressed to choose between conflicting interests, such that
the state could not serve as a neutral guardian of property rights. "3 In this
rare instance, insisted the Court, either "action" (enacting the statute) or "in-
action" (not enacting the statute) would have profound allocational effects. "14
The decision is routine in the sense that this situation-the state's necessarily
108 See Underkuffler, supra note 28, at 202-03 ("Property's function, as a social and govern-
mental institution, is the resolution of conflicting claims, visions, values, and histories. In this
process, some individuals win, and others lose; the protection of some is, inevitably, sacrificed for
the protection of others.").
109 See 276 U.S. 272, 277 81 (1928).
110 Id. at 277 78.
111 Id. at 279.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
11' See id. at 279 80 ("[w]hen forced to such a choice" and "here, the choice is unavoida-
ble.") (emphasis added).
114 See id. at 279.
[Vol. 59:1
Non-Enforcement Takings
having to choose between conflicting interests-presents itself in most every
property dispute.
Miller underscores the reality that the state cannot simply be a "watch-
man" for property rights. 115 Rather, by protecting property rights, the state
intervenes in conflicts over resources; by intervening in conflicts over re-
sources, the state protects property rights. The idea that the Constitution posi-
tions the state as the guardian of negative rights that all naturally enjoy in a
free and democratic society is inapposite when it comes to property. Property
rights necessarily are positive rights in that they exist only as a result of the
state's allocative choices, choices made with the social aspirations of a de-
mocracy grounded in dignity, equality, liberty, and the like in mind. These
choices reflect our collective values regarding which claims to limited re-
sources should be satisfied, which claims to those same resources should be
denied, and what rights go along with those designated as the "owners" of
such resources.
B. Allocating Property Interests Through Formal Decisions
Not to Enforce Existing Regulations
As Miller illustrates, the state can allocate property interests through the
direct route of deciding to adopt and enforce new regulatory safeguards and
obligations on land uses and through the indirect route of deciding not to
adopt those regulations. The examples discussed in this section-the first sur-
rounding Iowa's "right-to-farm" statute, the second involving Oregon's
Measure 37-illustrate that the state also can allocate property interests
through enacting but then deciding not to enforce regulations.
1. Iowa's Right to Farm Statute
"Right-to-farm" statutes are common across the United States. 116 The
Iowa "right-to-farm" statute, at issue in the Iowa Supreme Court's 1998 deci-
sion in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In and For Kossuth County, author-
ized local governmental entities to designate "agricultural areas" where cer-
tain owners would be immunized from certain nuisance claims of their neigh-
115 See Underkuffler, supra note 94, at 1042.
116 See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-
Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-
to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289,
289 (1984); Susanne A. Heckler, A Right to Farm in the City: Providing a Legal Frameworkfor
Legitimizing Urban Farming in American Cities, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 217, 217 18 (2012); J.B.
Ruh, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 315
16 (2000).
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bors. 7 The owner of 960-acres of undeveloped land, Gerald Girres, sought
this designation from the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors ("County")
so that he might construct a confined animal feeding operation, or "CAFO,"
on his land risk-free. 18 A CAFO "harbors in one place thousands or tens of
thousands of animals along with their attendant odors, wastes, flies, and ro-
dents." 119 Designation as an "agricultural area" would protect Girres from the
possibility that his neighbors might file a nuisance suit claiming that a new
CAFO would produce an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the adjacent lands on which they had long resided. 120 After initially
denying the designation request, the County changed course two months later
and granted it by a vote of 3-2.121
Fearing that the planned CAFO would substantially disrupt their ability
to reside comfortably in their home and reduce the value of their property,
neighbors Clarence and Caroline Bormann challenged the County's deci-
sion. 122 The Bormanns asserted that, prior to the designation, they had the
right to file suit if indeed a CAFO were constructed nearby and substantially
interfered with the use and enjoyment of their land, yet, after the designation,
they were deprived of this right. 123 Deeming this right to file a nuisance suit
so significant, they alleged that the statute authorizing agricultural designa-
tions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property on its face. 124 Siding
with the Bormanns, the Iowa Supreme Court held that by licensing Girres'
11' 584 N.W.2d 309, 311 12 (Iowa 1998).
118 Id. at 3 11; FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 11.
119 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 11.
120 See id. The right-to-farm statute at issue in Bormann offered immunity from certain nui-
sance suits to CAFOs in designated agricultural areas "regardless of the established date of opera-
tion." IOWA CODE § 352.11(1)(a) (1999). To some commentators, the application of the law to
those purchasers of lands adjacent to CAFOs already in existence arguably poses a separate ques-
tion, for those purchasers made their investment with the knowledge of-and likely paid a reduced
price because of their neighbors' ongoing activities. See EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 154 58
(suggesting that notice of regulation should mitigate compensatory awards in some instances on
an "assumption of risk" theory); Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 149, 191 (2000) (arguing that a takings claim directed at the type of statute
at issue in Bormann is more likely to succeed if the claimants purchased their home prior to en-
actment). But see Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,313,
10,318 (2001) (suggesting that when assessing whether the government's conduct reflects a legit-
imate updating of the meaning of ownership, the takings analysis should concentrate on the laws
in effect and rights held by the claimant on the date of the alleged taking rather than on the date of
property acquisition).
121 Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 311 12.122 Id. at 312.
121 d. at 313.
124 Id.
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creation of a nuisance, the County effectively transferred to Girres a property
interest in the form of an easement across the Bormann's land. 125
The decision is considered by many to be an anomaly in takings law. 1
26
It has been critiqued on numerous grounds, most persuasively on the possibil-
ity that the court's holding could be interpreted as freezing in place a particu-
lar understanding of the common law of nuisance. 127 On this interpretation of
the case, the legislature perpetually would be prohibited from reasonably ad-
justing what constitutes harm that rises to the level of a nuisance, whether it
be to expand the circumstances in which a nuisance might be found or, as
here, to contract them. 128 Doing so would "sever property's link to the culture
that it serves."' 129 From this perspective, the legislature's watering-down of
the state's nuisance law reflects Iowans' coalescence on a shift from (a) an
ecological, agrarian vision of property as protecting land and nurturing rela-
tionships between people and the land, to (b) a vision of property grounded in
125 See id. at319 22.
126 See, e.g., Adam Van Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as "Takings" in Light ofBormann v.
Board of Supervisors and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Association, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUT-
LOOK J. 169, 189 90 (2006) (characterizing the Bormann decision as "deeply flawed"); L. Paul
Goeringer & H.L. Goodwin, An Overview ofArkansas 'Right-to-Farm Law, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y
1, 14 (2013) ("The majority of states have reached the opposite conclusion of the Iowa courts.");
Todd J. Janzen Indiana Court of Appeals Upholds the Right to Farm Act, ABA AGRIC. MGMT.
COMMITTEE NEWSL., Aug. 2009, at 13 (noting that the Court of Appeals of Indiana's decision in
Lindsey v. DeGroot "puts Indiana in the column of states" that decline to follow the Bormann
holding); Renner Kincaid Walker, The Answer, My Friend, Is Blowin'in the Wind- Nuisance Suits
and the Perplexing Future of American Wind Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 509, 546 (2011)
(discussing how the Court of Appeals of Indiana found for the respondent-farm operation, rather
than the claimant, in a case similar to Bormann where the claimants brought a nuisance suit
against a dairy farm protected by the state's right-to-farm statute (citing Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898
N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009))). But see FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 274 (supporting the
result in Bormann in light of the questionable lawmaking procedures employed to adopt the legis-
lation at issue).
127 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY, ASPEN STUDENT TREATISE SERIES 105 n.17
(4th ed. 2013); Glicksman, supra note 120, at 190 (arguing that the Bormann court's decision is "a
constitutional judicial overriding of the accommodation of conflicting uses reached by ... the
state legislature of Iowa"); Walker, supra note 126, at 547 (contending that Bormann "constitu-
tionalizes the remarkably unpredictable common-law nuisance test").
" See Glicksman, supra note 120, at 190 (arguing that, under Bormann, courts must overturn
statutes that take "valuable private property interests and award[] them to strangers"). Among
other assertions, the court's speaking to the "elemental rights growing out of property ownership"
lends some support for this interpretation. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 320 (emphasis added).
129 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 259; see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial
Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 266 (2011), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/the-new-judicial-takings-construct [https://perma.cc/JN95-Z86J] (concluding that the posi-
tion advanced by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection would hinder property law's ability to conform with
changes in economics, society, technology, and the environment).
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opportunity, intensive development, and mobility. '30 It constitutes a substan-
tive adjustment to property interests statewide, and takings liability is inappo-
site because the legislation did not unfairly concentrate the economic burdens
of this change.
It is not clear, though, that Bormann can be so easily cast aside as aber-
rant. The institution of property operates on the presumption that, absent suf-
ficient justification, the government generally will act to protect property in-
terests where a worthy claim is pled. Governance is fair and just when proper-
ty interest holders can seek explanations for the government's failure to pro-
tect property interests; otherwise, the government need not align its enforce-
ment practices with democratic norms. 131 This reasoning supports the simple
notion that the right to press a legitimate complaint is a crucial part of a legit-
imate property interest. 1
32
Property rights work only because the state protects them via the law.
The value of property interests rests on the fact that there are in place trespass
laws, water quality and other environmental laws, housing and building
codes, zoning restrictions, and the like that are enforceable. To draw on the
seminal work of Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, a legal right entails a
"correlative" duty to act or refrain from acting. 133 Professor Hohfeld's analy-
sis pressed us to contemplate how the exercise and acknowledgement of legal
rights impacts others, and, correspondingly, how others are impacted when
these legal rights are not acknowledged. 134 If a "duty" cannot be enforced, it
is not actually a duty, and thus there is no corresponding legal right. 135 Non-
enforcement thus suggests that a person who had a duty to act or forbear,
were that right enforced, actually has a privilege not to act or forbear, and the
person who had the right to benefit from that act or forbearance actually has
130 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 37 38.
131 Id. at 269, 273 74 ("What landowners ought to have an opportunity to complain about are
curtailments of their rights that arise from government acts that are not justified as legitimate [and
uncompensated] changes.").
132 See, e.g., Jack Beennan, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism
andState Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 302 (1988) ("Property is definedby the cause
of action that is available to assert the property right."); Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of
Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1297 (2014) ("There is no basis for saying that something wrong-
ly impinges on others if we do not have a sense of what we have a right to be protected from.").
133 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicialReasoning, 23 YALE. L.J. 16, 28 32 (1913).
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforce-
ment of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987).
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no right at all. Instead, in such an instance, there exists only a mere hope that
another party will voluntarily undertake that act or forbearance. 1
36
In this vein, Bormann prompts us to consider not only the person whose
property is being "regulated" or "deregulated," but also the party experienc-
ing that regulation or deregulation from the other side. To Girres, the would-
be CAFO operator, the statute removed a substantial restriction infringing
upon a use to which he sought to put his land; yet, to the Bormanns, the stat-
ute imposed a substantial restriction upon a non-harmful use to which they
already had put their land long ago. 137 Depending on the extent and nature of
the negative externalities stemming from the CAFO, it is possible that statuto-
rily-mandated non-enforcement puts the Bormanns in the position where they
may not be able to use and enjoy their homestead at all. 138 This view frames
the question at issue in the following rather stark terms: Is a statute abrogating
the application of nuisance law in the single context of neighbors of landown-
ers who seek to use their land as a CAFO-which has the effect of making
the CAFO's neighbors' existing homes unlivable-unfair and unjust to those
neighbors absent compensation?
2. Oregon's Measure 37
The State of Oregon's infamous Measure 37 presents a similar story. In
passing this ballot initiative, the state's voters openly encouraged the non-
enforcement of land use restrictions. The law asserted, in relevant part:
If a public entity ... enforces [most any] land use regulation ...
that restricts the use of... private property... and has the effect of
136 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.").
137 See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 311 12. Explained in these terms, the Bonnanns' claim
relies in part on the theory that regulations that require owners to act in ways that prevent harm to
their communities should be less likely to be deemed takings than those that require owners to act
in ways that confer communal benefits. See Echeverria, supra note 63, at 10,485 (arguing that
government intrusions on private property interests that are intended to protect the community
from harm at-large are not as likely to be deemed takings as those that are intended for many other
purposes); Mulvaney, Exactionsfor the Future, supra note 26, at 558 59 (discussing when a mu-
nicipality might condition a development permit on a future interest in the permittee's property for
the protection of the whole community).
138 Cf United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263 67 (1946) (declaring low-level overflights
by government planes that required the surface owner to close his farm amounted to an unjustified
imposition of a "servitude" on the surface owner's land absent compensation).
20181
Boston College Law Review
reducing the fair market value of [that] property ... the owner...
shall be paid just compensation. 139
The law operated to modify the substance of all land use restrictions subject
to it by directing municipalities not to enforce those restrictions if it did not
plan to pay compensation for the economic diminution in property values
resulting from their enforcement. 140 Before voters substantially reduced the
impact of the law through another ballot initiative three years later, more than
seven thousand claims had been filed against municipal governments seeking
a total of seventeen billion dollars in compensation. 141 These local govern-
ments found no viable fiscal option but to forego enforcement of regulations
on zoning, subdivision, farming and forestry practices, transportation, and the
like that allegedly diminished property values. 142 The statute made no provi-
sion for those persons whose existing, legitimate property uses would be
jeopardized by the non-enforcement of the myriad rules subject to it. 143 From
these persons' perspective, the question here is akin to that in Bormann: Is
Measure 37's course commensurate with the principles of fairness and justice
absent compensation?
A more extensive assessment of the substantive legitimacy and takings
implications of Iowa's right-to-farm legislation and Oregon's Measure 37 is
not necessary to state the threshold point for which these examples are of-
fered here: the non-enforcement of existing property laws is itself a form of
state allocation that has the effect of protecting some claimed property inter-
ests while imposing real, non-trivial harms on others. Non-enforcement, of
course, is rarely legislatively codified in the manner of these two statutes. The
next section explains that, as in the Harris County dispute, non-enforcement
is far more commonly the product of executive officials' decision-making. 1
44
Yet the dual nature of the government's choice of whether or not to enforce an
139 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(1) (2005) (emphasis added) (current version at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 195.305(1) (2015)).
140 See Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2016).
141 id.
142 See OR. DEP'T OF LAND AND CONSERVATION DEV., BALLOT MEASURES 37 (2004) AND
49 (2007) OUTCOMES AND EFFECTS 5 (2011), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/publications/
m49_2011-01-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8WA-L6E5]. The claimants were using the market value
that had been established, in part, by a system of land use rules as the baseline from which they
alleged any enforcement of that system was causing their market value to decline. Id. at 34.
143 See, e.g., Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2005, at Al; Douglas Larson Measure 37 Puts Newberry Crater at Risk, REGIS-
TER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Sept. 11, 2006, at All.
144 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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existing regulatory safeguard or obligation-the reality that it necessarily will
both protect and impose on claimed property interests-is evident in both
instances.
C. Allocating Property Interests Through Informal Decisions
Not to Enforce Existing Regulations
The Iowa right-to-farm legislation and Oregon's Measure 37 reflect in-
stances in which the government legislatively codified its allocative choices
via non-enforcement. Returning to and refraining the dispute in Harris Coun-
ty reveals that less formalized non-enforcement resulting from executive offi-
cials' decision-making is, too, an exercise in state allocation. The following
refraining of Harris County is presented not to alter the facts of the case in
any material way but, rather, simply to illuminate the extent to which an in-
formal governmental decision not to enforce an existing property regulation
serves an allocative function.
The County, in adopting its flood control plan by local ordinance, ini-
tially made a specific allocative decision to recognize and protect specific
claims to property. Through this plan, the County distributed to downstream
landowners many of whom had already resided on their lands for some
time security from one hundred-year flood events by assuring that it would
not approve development of upstream lands in ways that would jeopardize
this security. In a technical sense, the plan distributed to the downstream
owners a negative servitude on the upstream owners 'lots. At that moment, the
upstream landowners maintained the ability to develop their properties,
though they were limited by the flood control plan s demanding that they do
so in ways that avoided markedly increasing the likelihood offlooding their
downstream neighbors. Later, without formally altering the ordinance adopt-
ing the flood control plan in any way, the County adjusted this allocative de-
cision by choosing not to enforce the plan against certain upstream develop-
ment. As a result, the County redistributed the downstream landowners'secu-
rity to these upstream landowners (i.e., it transferred the downstream owners'
negative servitude to the upstream owners), to the point where these upstream
landowners could (at least with respect to downstream flooding concerns)
develop their lands as they chose, even to the point of destroying existing uses
downstream and eliminating or at least placing in grave risk any possible
future downstream development. 145
The foregoing reiteration of the facts makes plain that the government's
decision on whether to enact and enforce a flood control plan will negatively
145 See Harris Cry. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 795 98 (Tex. 2016).
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impact someone s claim to free use or security from harm. If it chooses to en-
act and enforce the plan, the upstream developers' claimed property interest
to build on their lands as they choose will be quashed and the downstream
residents' claims to security from a significant flood risk will be respected; if
it instead chooses not to enact a flood control plan or not to enforce a plan
that it has enacted, it is the downstream residents whose claimed property
interests will suffer and the upstream developers whose property claims will
be sustained. Property interests are both protected and infringed upon regard-
less of the government's choice.
D. Allocating Property Interests and Takings Law
Reflecting on the three preceding sections, it seems that the state has
three broad categories of choices in allocating property interests. Consider,
for illustrative purposes (and in keeping with the theme of Harris County),
the flood control context. The state theoretically could: (1) formally enact and
enforce flood control regulations that secure downstream landowners from a
significant flood risk (and thereby constrain upstream landowners' freedom to
develop as they choose); (2) refrain from enacting regulations that secure
downstream landowners from a significant flood risk (and thereby directly
protect upstream landowners' freedom to develop); or (3) formally enact reg-
ulations that on their face secure downstream landowners from a significant
flood risk but choose not to enforce those regulations (and again, if indirectly
in this instance, protect upstream landowners' freedom to develop).
The first option-formally enacting and enforcing flood control regula-
tions that allocate security to downstream residents against a significant flood
risk and limit the freedom of upstream landowners to develop their land-
mirrors the enactment and anticipated enforcement of the historic preserva-
tion laws referenced earlier. These regulations are subject to a traditional reg-
ulatory takings challenge asserting that they produce an imposition on certain
users who would otherwise be free to develop without regard for flooding
concerns that is unfair and unjust absent compensation.
The second option-refraining from enacting regulations that secure
downstream landowners from a significant flood risk and thereby allocating
to upstream landowners the freedom to develop as they choose-protects the
claimed property interests of those who desire to develop their upstream
properties without regard for, say, the extent of the development's impervious
cover, but does so at the expense of imposing on those downstream neighbors
an increased risk of flooding. As with the first option, claimed property inter-
ests are both protected and imposed upon. It does not appear that any scholars
have advocated that the government broadly should be considered liable on
takings grounds for refraining from affirmatively enacting property re-
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strictions in response to public problems. (Consider, for instance, a situation
in which the state, on the facts of Miller v. Schoene, chose not to preserve the
region's chief crop-apples-by siding against legislatively requiring the
destruction of cedar trees, or, in keeping with the example here, chose not to
protect against significant flood risks by foregoing legislative adoption of a
flood control plan. 146) However, Professor Christopher Serkin recently ad-
vanced a theory of "passive takings" that would recognize the possibility of
government liability in at least some such related instances. 1
47
Professor Serkin's theory is best explained via one of his colorful illustra-
tions: Imagine a governmental entity adopts a regulation prohibiting coastal
landowners from erecting sea walls largely for aesthetic reasons. 14" This regu-
lation reflects the state's decision to allocate to neighboring landowners an
aesthetic easement of sorts. At the time of adoption, this regulation does not
significantly endanger the value of the regulated private lands. 149 Neverthe-
less, at some later point in time, due to global ecologic changes that make
sea-level rise in the region imminent, the law's application has a very differ-
ent effect, perhaps to the point of threatening complete flooding of these same
private lands because the owners cannot build walls to fend off the water. 1
50
Professor Serkin suggests that if the government leaves the allocation result-
ing from the regulatory prohibition on sea walls in place when an alternative
allocation would have (a) avoided the drastic harms borne by coastal owners
under the standing policy, and (b) been more socially useful, this failure to
adjust the extant allocation should be constitutionally challengeable as a
compensable taking under a traditional regulatory takings analysis. 151
146 The prospect of mudslides presents another salient contemporary example. See generally,
e.g., Plaintiffs' Complaint for Damages, Lester v. Snohomish County, No. 15-2-02098-6 SEA,
2015 WL 349084 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015) (addressing a claim by residents of property
destroyed by a mudslide that asserted rights to be informed about the possibility of mudslides,
regulated so as to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with mudslides, and relocated in the
event a mudslide makes their property uninhabitable); see also Michael Pappas, A Right to be
Regulated?, 24 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 99, 132 33 (2016).
141 See generally Serkin- supra note 90.148 Id. at 352 53.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 394 96.
151 Id. at 355 ("If private property owners sue the government for application of a stable legal
rule, they may be able to summon the power of the state to protect their property. And the state
may be constitutionally required to act or risk takings liability."). Inspired by Professor Serkin's
work, as well as derivatives of the "deregulatory takings" movement headlined by utility compa-
nies seeking compensation for sunk costs when Congress opened up utility markets in the 1980s,
Professor Michael Pappas recently advanced a "right to be regulated" theory. See generally Pap-
pas, supra note 146. Professor Pappas's theory suggests that property owners may have a "right to
be regulated" in accord with an established scheme say, for issuing taxi medallions, copyrights,
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This Article, of course, concentrates on the potential for takings liability
when the government chooses to allocate by means of the third option, as
illustrated by the state's formal enactment of regulations (which facially allo-
cate downstream security from a significant flood risk) that it chooses not to
enforce (and thereby circuitously protect upstream landowners' freedom to
develop). The non-enforcement takings theory offered here might be consid-
ered the inverse of Professor Serkin's passive takings theory in the sense that
passive takings claimants seek compensation for the government's not failing
to enforce an existing law, whereas non-enforcement takings claimants seek
compensation for the government's failing to enforce an existing law. 152 Fo-
cusing as it does on the third option of non-enforcement, this Article does not
present an appropriate space to assess Professor Serkin's theory in the depth it
deserves. Suffice it to say, though, that although any further development or
application of passive takings theory must be cognizant of moral hazard and
related concerns, 153 the theory itself illuminates the extent to which "inaction"
is very much a misnomer in the realm of property, for property is based in
most all instances on allocative decisions made by the state.
The third option-again, non-enforcement of existing regulations-that
is the focus of this Article similarly illuminates the reality that property inter-
or grazing permits such that they are due compensation for the government's formally and justi-
fiably adjusting the substance of the rights initially determined under that scheme. See id at 131.
152 Most of Professor Serkin's examples of what he sees as potential passive takings claims
take aim at the enforcement of existing regulatory duties. Select examples, though, are based on
the non-enforcement of existing regulatory duties: a sheriff's officer's refusal to enforce a court's
eviction order, see Serkin, supra note 90, at 381; a zoning board's refusal to grant a rezoning re-
quest when the law requires it to do so when land uses around the parcel so dictate, id at 382
(citing Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1999)); and a
zoning board's refusal to grant a rezoning request when the law imposes upon the board "a duty
... to relax its restrictions" when the land's "physical character" changes as the result of "natural
causes," making it "no longer adaptable to the use it is zoned for." Id. (citing Forde v. City of
Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941)). These latter examples align more than the former
examples with the potential non-enforcement takings claims I discuss here.
153 Passive takings liability could exacerbate the moral hazard problem that plagues federal
flood insurance and disaster relief policies. Professor Serkin acknowledges this possibility, but
suggests that recognizing passive takings liability would have only a minor effect on owners'
investment incentives because the chances of prevailing under his passive takings theory are small
just as they are in traditional regulatory takings cases. See Serkin, supra note 90, at 387. The slope
may be more slippery than Professor Serkin allows, however. In short, existing regulations are far
exceeded by the infinite number of conceivable regulations that are not in existence. As Professor
Serkin concedes, "creative lawyers ... may be able to identify relevant comparators that could
make such claims successful." Id. at 402. In this way, the driver in crafting social and economic
legislation uncomfortably shifts from the government to individual takings claimants. For a
thoughtful critique of Professor Serkin's proposal that addresses not only the moral hazard ques-
tion but also various others, see David Dana, Incentivizing Municipalities to Adapt to Climate
Change: Takings Liability and FEMA Reform as Possible Solutions, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
281, 287 89, 301 (2016).
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ests are both protected and imposed upon in most every case. The two
claimed interests-downstream security from a significant flood risk and up-
stream freedom to develop without regard for impervious coverage-cannot
exist concurrently. To draw on the words of Justices William Douglas and
Arthur Goldberg spoken in a similar context, "The State in one way or anoth-
er puts its full force behind a policy." 154 By choosing among the available
allocative options-which it must do-the state is making property law and,
in the process, it is both recognizing and rejecting claimed property rights.
In Harris County, the County created and adopted a flood control plan,
and, in doing so, it allocated property rights. 155 It then chose not to enforce
that flood control plan, which, if indirectly, necessarily produced an alternate
allocation. 156 The question is not, as the Texas Supreme Court had suggested,
whether "doing nothing more than allowing private parties to use their prop-
erties as they wish" can serve as the basis for a takings claim, 157 so the case,
therefore, does not raise the parade of horribles on which the court based its
decision. 158 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the purpose of
the Takings Clause is to "bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' 159 Takings law should police allocations resulting from
non-enforcement decisions that allegedly force some people to alone bear
public "burdens"-or, perhaps more appropriately, responsibilities on the
same "fairness and justice" grounds that it polices allocations resulting from
decisions to enact and enforce new regulations. 160
Following this course, the question in Harris County is whether the
County's allocation resulting from its decision not to enforce its flood control
plan contravened the principles of fairness and justice, as these principles
have been defined in the takings context through the long line of precedents
154 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 257 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
state's arresting and prosecuting African Americans for violating the rules of common law tres-
pass by entering a privately-owned establishment open to the public should be subject to an Equal
Protection analysis).
155 See Harris Cry., 499 S.W.3d at 796.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 804.
158 See id. at 807 10,
159 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Supreme Court has cited Arm-
strong in many of its major takings decisions. E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 304, 321 (2002); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
"' As noted above, according to Professor Serkin takings law also should police allocations
resulting from the state's continuing to enforce long-existing regulations when underlying condi-
tions have changed. See supra notes 147 153 and accompanying text.
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contemplating the considerations discussed in Penn Central.16 1 Takings law
exhibits extensive deference to the state's allocative decisions when choosing
among valid alternatives. But it does not, as Harris County suggests, provide
the state with absolute immunity no matter how unfair and unjust the bases
upon which its allocative decisions rest. 162
The proposition advanced in this Part-that the state allocates property
rights when it chooses not to enforce existing property laws (whether formal-
ly, as in the statute at issue in Bormann and Oregon's Measure 37, or infor-
mally, as in Harris County), and that such decisions thus should be subject to
takings review to assure they are fair and just absent compensation-does not
automatically mean that someone impacted by such a non-enforcement deci-
sion is entitled to the Takings Clause's constitutional remedy. 163 Rather, it
simply suggests that courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and
categorically prohibit non-enforcement takings claims, as the Texas Supreme
Court did in Harris County, in favor of assessing those claims on the merits.
161 See supra notes 34 49 and accompanying text.
162 This same reasoning lends some support to the view that the Deshaney line of jurispru-
dence exempting the state from having to offer any justification for its refusal to act in many cir-
cumstances which includes both old landmark decisions, see, e.g., South v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 396, 402403 (1855) (dismissing a kidnap victim's claim that the sheriff unconstitution-
ally refused to secure his release despite knowing that he had been kidnapped and where he was
detained), and new ones, see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767 69 (2005) (reject-
ing a claim that there exists a property right to enforcement of a restraining order under state law
that can only be deprived upon the provision of fair procedures) may be due for a fresh look. See
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1714 18 (2004) (advocating judicial review of agency refusals to enforce
for arbitrariness); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 253, 285 88 (2003) (asserting that Marbury v. Madison's command to "say what
the law is" obliges courts to review the rationale behind agency decisions not to enforce); see also
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 791 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that where the state undertakes
an obligation and an individual "justifiably relie[s] on that undertaking," the Due Process Clause
"at the very least" demands that "the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the claimant and then
apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision"); Deshaney v. Winnebago Cly. Dep't of Soc.
Sews., 489 U.S. 189, 210 11 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e do not know why [state
officials] did not take steps to protect Joshua [from abuse by his custodial parent]; the Court, how-
ever, tells us that their reason is irrelevant so long as their inaction was not the product of invidi-
ous discrimination. .... I would allow Joshua and his mother the opportunity to show that respond-
ents' failure to help him arose, not out of the sound exercise of professional judgment ... but from
... arbitrariness that we have in the past condemned.") (citations omitted). On the Deshaney ma-
jority more generally distinguishing between positive and negative liberties, see supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
163 See Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 746 ("No complex society can adhere to a rule that
makes it liable for every change in circumstance, disappointment, or frustration that every indi-
vidual endures at government hands.").
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The next Part considers the application of the regulatory takings princi-
ples of fairness and justice to the non-enforcement context through a series of
examples. In the course thereof, it offers two conclusions. First, most non-
enforcement takings claims should be rejected, just as their traditional regula-
tory takings counterparts so often are. 164 The rejection of those claims on the
theory advanced here, however, is grounded not on the view that the state is
somehow categorically uninvolved in such cases, but rather on the finding
that the state's allocative decision via non-enforcement reflected a constitu-
tionally fair and just choice without the need for compensation.165 Second,
though, as with traditional regulatory takings, some exceptional non-
enforcement cases in which takings liability may be appropriate do exist.
Namely, liability might attach where the state (a) unjustifiably fails to prevent
confiscation or significant degradation of a legally recognized interest that is
not causing harm or interfering with others' legitimate property rights; (b)
unjustifiably singles out individuals among similarly situated persons to bear
a wholly disproportionate weight of a non-enforcement decision instead of
legitimately adjusting property allocations wholesale; or (c) retroactively and
unjustifiably diverges from what a reasonable owner could have possibly ex-
pected when she invested in property and put that property to a legitimate use
in reliance on existing law.
III. APPLICATION OF REGULATORY TAKINGS PRINCIPLES
TO NON-ENFORCEMENT
The foregoing pages have presented two general claims. Part I asserted
that regulatory takings law generally assesses whether state decisions to enact
and enforce new regulatory safeguards and obligations that reflect new allo-
cations of property rights produce fair and just impositions absent the pay-
ment of compensation, with the meaning of fairness and justice determined
through contextualized application of the types of considerations identified in
Penn Central and elucidated by precedent. 166 Part II contended that, much as
the state makes an allocative decision when it enacts and enforces new regu-
lations, it also makes an allocative decision when it decides not to enforce
existing regulations. 167 Therefore, allocations reached in this manner should
be subject to takings law's fairness and justice analysis, too. Through a series
of examples, this Part considers the application of regulatory takings law, as
164 See infra notes 170 191 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 194 273 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 11 78 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 79 165 and accompanying text.
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defined in Part I, to the types of allocative decisions-those grounded in non-
enforcement of existing property laws-discussed in Part II.
Section A below briefly outlines several situations that, on the approach
advanced here, should be considered "easier" non-enforcement takings cases
in that they represent fair and just exercises of enforcement discretion in the
face of concerns regarding rivalrous harms, competing public interests, and
constantly evolving human values.' 68 Section B works through several exam-
ples that present "harder" applications of takings law's principles to non-
enforcement decisions, including the aforementioned Harris County v Kerr
case. 169 This latter set of examples is not presented in an effort to offer a de-
finitive result on whether a compensable non-enforcement taking occurred in
any individual instance. Rather, it is presented to highlight that, despite what
the many lower court cases that reject the very possibility of non-enforcement
takings liability might imply, non-enforcement poses some challenging "fair-
ness and justice" issues that are well worth consideration on the merits.
A. Easier Cases
1. Trespass-Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Likely to Lie
A landowner's "right to exclude" is generally protected by trespass law.
This right, of course, is not absolute, and there are many situations in which
trespass law is inapplicable. For instance, where an owner begins to open up
her property to the public or otherwise operates the property in a manner that
is more appropriately understood as public than private, the strength of the
owner's exclusionary interest begins to diminish and eventually trespass law
ceases to apply. 170 Numerous other doctrines, such as those of necessity
17 1
168 See infra notes 170 191 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 192 273 and accompanying text.
170 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 10 (1946) (holding that a company-town cannot
criminalize the distribution of religious literature within the municipality); Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 48 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a shopping center cannot deny
access to individuals because they want to circulate a petition to other shoppers), aff'd, 447 U.S.
74 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 779 84
(N.J. 1994) (holding that, subject to reasonable conditions, community and regional shopping
centers must allow leafleting of political and societal issues); State v. Schnild, 423 A.2d 615, 630
33 (N.J. 1980) (holding that a private university cannot evict an individual and secure her arrest on
the basis of distributing political literature on campus); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 75
(N.J. 1971) (holding that it is not a trespass for an attorney and a medical services worker, em-
ployed by non-profit corporations, to visit a migratory farm worker who lives on the property of
his employer without the employer's supervision).
171 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Magadini, 52 N.E.3d 1041, 1052 54 (Mass. 2016) (holding
that necessity can be a defense to trespass).
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and prescription, 172 also limit the circumstances in which the application of
trespass law is appropriate. But where these or other justifications are not at
stake, there is a strong case that the state's refusal to enforce trespass laws-
say, where a non-owner occupies an owner's home by acquiring the keys to
the home via subterfuge or threat of force-amounts to a compensable tak-
ing. 173 Non-enforcement in this instance results in the transfer of a property
interest that currently is being used as a private home to a third party stranger
when that property does not bear the markers of a public space, its use is
causing no harm, and the stranger has no legitimate justification for her occu-
pation. The state's non-enforcement is not generally applicable, creates little
by way of reciprocal advantage, and is untethered from any reasonable effort
to manage social and economic relationships; indeed, it works against opera-
tionalizing constitutional norms of dignity and equality. 174
2. Roadway Maintenance-Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Not Likely
to Lie
While the non-enforcement of trespass law in the aforementioned hypo-
thetical example is a relatively easy case in which to find non-enforcement
takings liability as it has been outlined in this Article, disputes akin to that in
the Florida District Court of Appeals' 2011 decision in Jordan v St. John s
County 175 present relatively easy cases in which to reject liability. The dispute
in Jordan derived from a decision by the State of Florida in 1960 to re-reroute
State Highway A1A approximately eight hundred feet west of its original lo-
cation immediately fronting the Atlantic Ocean. 176 Twenty years later, the
State deeded the original roadway-which became known as the "Old
A1A"-to St. John's County.177 Old AlA provided the only vehicular access
to and ran the length of a 1.6-mile spit of sand between the Intracoastal Wa-
172 See, e.g., White v. Hartigan, 982 N.E.2d 1115, 1126 (Mass. 2013) (explaining that the
lengthy use of another's property for a specific purpose can ripen into an easement).
173 Cf. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1049 (2009) (intimating that landowner A has no legal or
moral right to call on the police to take down a sign on his neighbor B's property that expresses
support for a particular politician).
174 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 105 (contending that the government "can't simply refuse to
enforce trespass laws," for such a "deprivation of legal protection would be close to legally de-
stroying my property right.... [and] probably would violate the Takings Clause"); id. ("Civilized
life requires that the government positively protect property ... [,] [for] while the political process
must have a great deal of flexibility in deciding the scope of such protection, some amount of such
protection is constitutionally required.").
175 Jordanv. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
176 id.
177 id.
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terway and the ocean. 178 By this time, the "road" did not include a fully paved
driving surface in light of erosion and frequent storm damage; indeed, the
ocean actually had flowed over it on multiple occasions in the past. 1
79
At the time the County acquired the roadway, several homes already ex-
isted along the road's frontage. 8 0 In the intervening years, the County ap-
proved the development of additional homes, which, together with the homes
that pre-dated the County's acquisition of the road, locals referred to as the
"Summer Haven subdivision."'" Old A1A, however, continued to be the sub-
ject of repeated damage from coastal storms. 18 2 The impacts stemming from
these storms made it difficult for the County to maintain the road, despite the
fact that, in the five years preceding the takings lawsuit, the County had spent
on Old A1A "more than 25 times the County average annual maintenance cost
per mile." 18 3 Homeowners in Summer Haven found the County's efforts insuf-
ficient, and ultimately filed suit alleging that the County's failure to do enough
to maintain uninterrupted roadway access to the barrier island amounted to a
taking of their property without the payment ofjust compensation. 184
With little explanation, a Floridian appellate panel concluded that, re-
gardless of the circumstances, the County has an "affirmative duty to act"
under state law to "provide a reasonable level of maintenance that affords
meaningful access" at, presumably according to the decision, all times of eve-
ry day and night.185 The panel reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the County and remanded for a determination as to whether the
maintenance the County had performed had been reasonable or, instead, "[s]o
deficient as to constitute a de facto abandonment."
8 6
On the theory of non-enforcement takings advanced here, the homeown-
ers' takings claim on remand is not particularly persuasive. The County had
provided uninterrupted roadway access to the island for a significant period
of time despite the increasingly marked and, relative to other roads, dispro-
portionate expense of doing so.'8 7 The impacts of climate change, including
sea-level rise and coastal storms of greater intensity, led the County to rea-
sonably conclude that it could no longer provide safe and meaningful access
178 id.
179 See Petitioner's Brief on Jurisdiction at 1, St. Johns County v. Jordan, 77 So. 3d 647 (Fla.
Dec. 5, 2011) (No. SC11-1294), 2011 WL 12473580, at *1.
"' Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 837.
181 Id.
182 id.
183 See Petitioner's Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 179, at *2.
114 See Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 837.1
15 Id. at 838 39.
186 Id. at 839.
117 Id. at 837.
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during all flooding events.' 88 Limiting roadway access to the homeowners in
Summer Haven without compensation is justified on the view that these own-
ers purchased land in a dangerous coastal zone that had been highly regulated
for more than 50 years, such that they should have anticipated the possibility
of the government's interrupting convenient access periodically in the face of
ecological developments. The type of interest imposed upon-a home inter-
est-is a pressing one, 189 though, in terms of the severity of the impact here,
the County's decision did not produce an imposition akin to ouster.190 The
homes in Summer Haven have not been deemed uninhabitable and, at least
until nature suggests otherwise, the owners can continue to access their
homes by car when the roadway is not flooded (which, for now, is most of the
time) and at least theoretically can consider other forms of access-either by
air or water-when it is. 191
3. Vehicular Speed Limits-Non-Enforcement Takings Liability Not Likely
to Lie
For a perhaps simpler, more systemic example of a situation in which
non-enforcement takings liability is unlikely, consider the non-enforcement of
posted vehicular speed limits. It is now well established that speeding plays a
significant role in accident causation. Imagine one's formerly quiet residential
street is increasingly used as a cut-through for commuters to get to the on-
ramp for a major thoroughfare in light of new, higher density development
patterns in surrounding neighborhoods. The street's posted speed limit re-
mains at a safe twenty-five miles per hour, but drivers now regularly exceed
that number by ten to twenty miles per hour during peak commuting times
and only a small percentage are ticketed. Many residents of the street have
young children who routinely play in their front yards. These residents plead
with the city to increase its enforcement of the speed limit, but to no avail.
They thereafter consider the prospect of filing a takings suit alleging that the
city's non-enforcement of its speed limit is substantially interfering with the
use and enjoyment of their land and negatively affecting their lands' market
value.
Though these residents' plight deservedly will engender sympathy, the
non-enforcement takings claims here, like those in Jordan, are rather uncon-
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1007
(1982).
19' Even if the County's decision did result in a constructive eviction, it may be deemed non-
compensable where the decision sought to protect against significant harm to persons and proper-
ty. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
191 See Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 837.
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vincing. Further factual development of course would be necessary in an ac-
tual case, but there generally seems plausible ground in this context to argue
that the city is doing the best it can in the face of resource limitations, and the
residents and prospective purchasers likely have low-cost options to avoid the
alleged harm to their use and enjoyment (fencing, resorting to alternative play
areas at rush hour, etc.). Furthermore, any imposition is dispersed city-wide
(provided the city has not selectively identified this particular section of this
particular road as an area where speeding will not be enforced regardless of
resource availability), and, though the city could anticipate that not all resi-
dents will be pleased with all of its enforcement and budgetary choices, these
residents could not reasonably have expected absolute enforcement of the
city's speeding laws.
B. Harder Cases
The prior section briefly outlined three prototypical non-enforcement
situations that should be considered "easier" non-enforcement takings cases.
The first situation (involving the non-enforcement of trespass law against a
deceitful intruder) does not represent an exercise of enforcement decision-
making discretion that aligns with the principles of fairness and justice absent
compensation as those principles have been illuminated through takings ju-
risprudence's interpretation of the considerations discussed in Penn Cen-
tral. 192 The latter two situations (involving the non-enforcement of roadway
maintenance and vehicular speeding laws, respectively) do represent such an
exercise of enforcement decision-making discretion. 193 Varying these latter
two fact patterns, however, can make the non-enforcement takings question in
these situations more challenging. Imagine, for instance, that a county ap-
proved the construction of the first homes on a barrier island and enacted leg-
islation providing for roadway, emergency, and other services to the island,
only to decide without justification not to spend any of the funds dedicated to
those services immediately after the home construction was completed. Or
envision drivers regularly exceeding the twenty-five miles-per-hour speed
limit by fifty to sixty miles per hour, to the point where residents of homes
fronting the road cannot safely enter and exit their driveways even at off-peak
hours. These hypothetical variations illustrate that takings cases involve a
matter of degree, and thereby reinforce the notion that normative judgment is
required to assess the character of the imposition resulting from the govern-
ment's decision not to enforce. This section explores the competing argu-
ments in three actual examples that, on the non-enforcement takings theory
192 See supra notes 170 174 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 175 191 and accompanying text.
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advanced here, present especially hard cases. For each of these challenging
case examples, the section walks through potential arguments on the state's
behalf before setting out the claimants' potential counter-positions.
1. Non-Enforcement of a Flood Control Plan: Harris County v. Kerr
The matter at hand in Harris County v. Kerr has been well-documented
above, such that only the briefest refresher of the facts is in order: The County
adopted a flood control plan by local ordinance that allocated to downstream
landowners security from one hundred-year flood events by assuring that it
would not approve development of upstream lands in ways that would jeop-
ardize this security. This allocation took the form of conferring on down-
stream landowners a negative covenant of sorts that entitled them to partial
property rights in upstream lots. Later, without altering the ordinance adopt-
ing the flood control plan, the County adjusted this allocative decision by
choosing not to enforce the plan against certain upstream development,
thereby effectively dissolving the covenant held by downstream residents. 194
County Positions: Faced with justifying this allocative decision as fair
and just absent the payment of compensation, the County might contend-
much like the government entities in the road maintenance and vehicular
speeding examples-that its decision not to enforce its flood control plan
against these specific upstream developers was an unintentional but nonethe-
less reasonable one made in the face of budgetary and personnel con-
straints. 195 There commonly is a wide disjunction between (a) a government
entity's jurisdiction to enforce its regulations, and (b) the resources dedicated
to do so; in this way, non-enforcement of the sort at issue here is implicitly
ingrained within the regulatory structure. 196 A high-level County official
194 Harris Cry. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 795 98 (Tex. 2016).
195 See supra notes 175 191 and accompanying text. Relatedly, though unlikely directly rele-
vant in Harris County, non-enforcement might result from enforcement officials' lack of familiari-
ty with complex new rules, as seems conceivable and arguably understandable at least during
some very limited transitional period with respect to regulations that focus on highly technical
processes, such as those surrounding the extraction of subsurface resources. See, e.g., David L.
Callies, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 271, 273, 278 313 (2015)
(explaining the "complex interplay of regulations" regarding hydraulic fracturing). In others, even
relatively simple technological innovations may adjust the playing field so rapidly and markedly
that the law will be particularly slow to catch up or fill in, such as Uber' s break-neck entry into the
field of rides-for-hire.
19' Indeed, some expansive laws explicitly incorporate versions of non-enforcement in multi-
ple ways. For one example, many zoning schemes specifically build in formal measures not to
enforce, including variances and other exceptions that are relevant to properties possessing identi-
fied, generally applicable characteristics such as topography that would make development of land
in strict compliance with the zoning scheme impracticable. At least in the basic terms described
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spoke to this point at trial, testifying that "[a]lthough White Oak Bayou was
always a high priority, with limited... funding the [County] also had to con-
sider other high priority projects ....197 Perhaps the County did not have the
funding to support permitting officials' conducting detailed reviews of every
upstream development application to assure the developers-applicants were
adequately mitigating downstream flooding concerns in accord with the
County ordinance delineating its flood control plan. This reality does not de-
tract from the flood control plan's promoting the general welfare. Indeed, its
non-enforcement does not stem from designs on any particular properties and,
assessed over time and considered in conjunction with the County's other
land use controls, roughly assures reciprocal advantages for the impacted
populace as a whole.
Alternatively, the County might concede that it had intentionally made
some decisions to deviate from the flood control plan that were unrelated to
resource and personnel constraints, but instead were made upon determina-
tions that assumptions on which the plan originally was based had become
outdated. 198 On this alternative contention, enforcement officials might simp-
ly be responding to anticipated legislative action in service of the public in-
terest by deciding not to enforce a law that it appears will soon be formally
overridden or repealed.
Either way, the County's exercise of its enforcement power under these
conditions demands that its enforcement officials use their discretion in mak-
ing value judgments and establishing priorities. 199 In the federal administra-
here, these efforts are assumed to mirror Oregon's Measure 37 in the sense that they are generally
applicable.
197 Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 805; see also id. (testifying that the White Oak Bayou received its
"appropriate share" of funding given the available resources). In some instances, non-enforcement
might result from political unwillingness to dedicate resources to more complete enforcement. In
other instances, there may be rising public opinion that the wisdom of any enforcement at all is up
for debate. See, e.g., Tiago Pappas, Providing Property Owners Increased Certainty in the Con-
flicting Medical Marijuana Landscape, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 249, 267 80 (2010) (discussing debate
surrounding the use of land to grow small amounts of marijuana for personal medicinal purposes);
Peter C. Yeager, Crime and Inequality in the Regulatory State, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 250
54 (1995) (discussing the moral challenges to enforcing "white-collar" regulation "in the face of
economic stagnation and decline").
19' See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 798. Such a decision might be conceived of as an effort to
counter a potential "passive" takings claim, as such claims have been defined by Professor Serkin.
See supra notes 147 153 and accompanying text.
199 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 798. In some instances, enforcement priorities are explicit,
such as the federal government's immigration policy under President Barack Obama of deferring
action for childhood arrivals. In others, they are implicit or even haphazard. Explicit prioritizing
might be seen as overriding legislative authority to set policy, a traditional separation-of-powers
concern; however, it might also serve important separation-of-powers principles, such as transpar-
ency and consistency. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration
Law Redux, 125 YALEL.J. 104, 208 13 (2015).
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live law context, the Supreme Court has deemed enforcement agencies' dis-
cretionary decisions not to enforce presumptively un-reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act,200 and local government law is only slightly
more generous in cases involving claimants seeking writs of mandamus to
compel enforcement of permitting programs and other local land use laws.20 '
Much the same could be said of criminal prosecutorial discretion. Non-
enforcement takings law should not divert markedly from this well-established
course of affording enforcement agencies and officials flexibility, even if the
remedy generally is not injunctive relief but compensation. Were it to do so,
in the immortal words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the government
"hardly could go on."
20 2
To further press the point, the County might allege that, outside of ex-
treme circumstances not present here, non-enforcement is best conceived of
as a risk to which citizens are exposed. Were it not, government incentives
might be inverted against the public interest. The prospect of traditional regu-
latory takings liability already chills the government's adoption of environ-
mental protection and safety measures that impacted landowners might chal-
lenge as too stringent. Indeed, full enforcement here could prompt legitimate
takings claims from the upstream owners. Recognizing liability for the non-
enforcement of existing rules would serve to exacerbate this chilling effect.
The government constantly would be looking over both shoulders-one for
those asserting takings claims that the government is enforcing regulations
that are too restrictive, the other for those claiming that the government is
enforcing regulations in a way that is too permissive. It might choose, then, to
avoid moving forward with most any studies and contemplated regulation
dictated by them, on the view that a governmental entity cannot be challenged
for enforcing or failing to enforce a regulation that does not exist. 20 3 The
County's flood control plan was enacted to protect the County's residents, not
to reassign from developers to the County the burden of liability stemming
from development that proves harmful.20 4 As it endeavors to implement this
200 See Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 38 (1985).
201 The circumstances in which a court will order what is often referred to as the "extraordi-
nary" writ of mandamus are quite narrow. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining
the general requirements for a court to issue a writ of mandamus).
202 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
203 See Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 810 ("If the County had undertaken no efforts to control
flooding, the homeowners could not assert the failure to complete [the adopted flood control plan]
as a basis for liability."). For a brief discussion on the prospect of the government's being consid-
ered liable on takings grounds for refraining from enacting regulations to counter public problems,
i.e., "non-enactment" takings, see supra notes 147 153 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 833 (Tex. 2005) (O'Neill, J., concur-
ring) ("[W]hen a private development floods neighboring land, the owner of the damaged property
will ordinarily have recourse against the private parties causing the damage.").
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general plan enacted with the protection of the public in mind, the County
should not be charged with having to forecast specific impositions that might
result from the conduct of private parties who undertake activities in contra-
vention of the flood control plan that allegedly cause the harms complained of
here. Any remedy to which the claimants may be entitled-perhaps, for in-
stance, on common law nuisance grounds-must come from the upstream
developers themselves, not the County.
The County might offer yet another reason why the takings claim (and
perhaps a private nuisance claim, as well) should fail: the downstream resi-
dents-by constructing or purchasing their homes in a floodplain-put them-
selves in this situation where they would be prone to injury even from the
benign conduct of their neighbors building their own homes. Simply because
these downstream residents or their forbearers were the first in time to devel-
op in this area should not automatically concretize as reasonable their alleged
expectation that, unless compensated, they have ultimate say in how their
community develops and evolves around them.
Claimant Positions: Conversely, the downstream residents might argue
that the County knew or should have known that its electing this course in
defiance of its adopted flood control plan would come at the sacrifice of
longstanding residences in the downstream claimants' neighborhood. On this
view, the County deliberately chose not to enforce its flood control plan to,
perhaps, serve the public interest of facilitating upstream development to ex-
pand its tax base and promote economic development. It might have chosen
to facilitate upstream development by amending the generally applicable
flood plan without implicating takings protections, for the responsibilities
stemming from that amendment presumably would be fairly and broadly dis-
persed. Instead, though, the County vastly increased the likelihood of down-
stream flooding in the claimants' specific neighborhood as a targeted sacrifice
to promote these public interests. Concentrated non-enforcement at the ex-
pense of existing property rights of this sort, if uncompensated, can have a
corrosive effect on citizens' belief in and respect for the law and, in turn, lead
to demoralization in affected communities, heightening these communities'
members' suspicions that the legal system will protect them from others' dan-
gerous and injurious acts. °5 Perhaps non-enforcement can be undertaken in
the concentrated manner in which Harris County chose to expand the Coun-
ty's tax base and pursue economic development in the same way that these
goals are considered allowable public uses of the outright exercise of the gov-
25 See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1214 16 (defining "demoralization costs" as constitut-
ing the psychological impact on non-parties when a takings claimant is not afforded compensa-
tion).
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eminent's eminent domain power;20 6 however, where this course is chosen,
takings compensation should be due.
What, though, if the County's decision not to enforce its ordinance de-
lineating its flood control plan is not justified as serving a public use? Imag-
ine that, in accord with Kelo v City of New London, the state's offering eco-
nomic development as its public aim of non-enforcement is mere "pretext"
for conferring private benefits on select upstream landowners.2 °7 Or, even if
the state's decision can surmount Kelo's pretext inquiry for federal constitu-
tional purposes, it may not be sufficient to meet the narrower understanding
of "public uses" for which the eminent domain power can be employed in
many states.20 8 In this instance, the County's decision ideally should be en-
joined and the property interest restored to its owners downstream.
The scenario offered in the preceding paragraph raises the sticky ques-
tion of whether takings compensation is appropriate when it is not possible to
restore the property to its owner. Here, the County cannot undo the destruc-
tion of the claimants' homes. 20 9 To some analysts, an inability to restore a
claimant's interest is of no matter to a takings case when the state's decision
that led to that interest's destruction did not serve a public use. For instance,
according to Professor John Echeverria, the Takings Clause assumes the gov-
ernment has the power to condemn property outright for lawful purposes and
merely places a condition-the payment of compensation-on the exercise of
that power.210 Just compensation is thus constitutionally authorized only
where it funds an appropriation that serves a legitimate public purpose.
Where a state decision is not oriented toward a legitimate public end, the un-
compromising remedy of enjoining the deprivation and restoring the property
to its owner is more appropriate than the compromising remedy of allowing
the deprivation upon the payment of takings compensation.2 ' It is fair to say,
206 See Kelo v. City of New London- 545 U.S. 469, 483 87 (2005) (concluding that the con-
demnation of non-blighted residential properties for purposes of creating jobs and improving the
local tax base promoted a "public use," as required by the Federal Constitution's Takings Clause,
despite the fact that some of the condemned properties would be leased to for-profit corporations
for the construction of private mixed-use development).
207 See id. at 477 78 (stating that a municipality cannot "be allowed to take property under the
mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit").
2. Post-Kelo, more than 40 states-including Texas, the site of Harris County-amended their
laws in a purported effort to limit the extent to which the government could exercise its power of
eminent domain exclusively for economic development purposes. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 2206.001 (West 2005) (amended 2011).
'09 Harris Cty., 499 S.W.3d at 813 14 (Lehrman, J., concurring).
210 See John Echeverria, Takings andErrors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2000).
211 See, e.g., Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 925 26 (Tex. 1962) (declaring void a local
government's decision to condemn a private lane solely to allow a neighbor access to a public
road in addition to the one to which he already had access, for such a condemnation did not serve
a public purpose).
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therefore, that takings law ordinarily rears its head only in those instances
where an "otherwise proper" state decision to adjust a property law causes
particular owners to shoulder particular types of responsibilities that are un-
fair and unjust for the state to impose without compensation."'
212 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (quoting First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)). The chemistry
between the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause has been
the subject of extensive debate. Perspectives on the matter, even among proponents of similar
conceptions of property, are not uniform, at least on a granular level. Two prominent examples
will suffice to illustrate the point. Professor Nestor Davidson has raised concerns that focusing on
equality norms in takings cases somewhat ironically may provide more protections to those hold-
ing large shares of property than to those holding small shares, which he deems untoward because
the former hold far more sway in the political process than the latter. See Nestor Davidson, The
Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 41 44 (2008). In his view, without a real-
istic possibility that those holding small shares (or even no share at all) will have a meaningful
place at the regulatory takings table, Professor Davidson exhibits a preference for courts' examin-
ing the distributive character of regulatory impositions strictly under the confines of Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence. Id. at 44 49, 48 n.270. Alternatively, Professor Peter Gerhart has suggested
that any regulation that unfairly singles out owners to bear the burdens of regulatory adjustments
is illegitimate under what he describes as an "equality principle," and any such "individualized
burden" and "unequal reduction in property values" must be enjoined on procedural due process
grounds. See PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SocIAL MoRALITY 266 67, 274 75, 290,
305 (2014). These leading works, among others, raise important questions about leaning heavily
on takings remedies to combat distributive injustices. Professor Davidson's and Professor Ger-
hart's theories, however, would largely resign the Takings Clause to applying only in those in-
stances where governmental conduct results in a physical appropriation of property. Though oth-
ers have joined them in offering arguments worthy of consideration on this point, see, e.g., J. Peter
Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q.
89, 114 15 (1995) (arguing that the regulatory takings doctrine should be abandoned because "it
deprives the state of its basic power to define property rights"); William Michael Treanor, Keynote
Address: 14th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings Challenges to Land Use and Environmen-
tal Regulations, 36 VT. L. REV. 503, 503 15 (2012) (arguing that the regulatory takings doctrine
misconstrues the original intent of the Takings Clause and should be interpreted to cover only
physical takings of property), no Supreme Court Justice in the past century has displayed any
appetite for considering the wholesale abolition of regulatory takings law. Moreover, perhaps the
existence of some regulatory takings doctrine is for the better, in the sense that takings analysis
at least as advanced here may root out and provide compensation for select instances of rather
extreme unfair and unjust treatment in the realm of property law that currently are not meaningful-
ly enjoin-able under Equal Protection and Due Process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 66 (1977) (finding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is implicated only in those instances of clear, intentional discriminatory treatment by
the government, without which even tremendous disparate impacts on traditionally marginalized
classes-let alone the poor, whom the Court has never deemed such a class are of no matter).
Indeed, were regulatory takings analysis to be abolished, there would be no need for the principle
recognized in some form in a great number of municipalities that, although governmental entities
need and have great latitude to update their zoning plans periodically, existing structures that do
not conform with an updated plan need not be demolished immediately when they are not posing
significant harm to neighbors or the community more generally. See, e.g., Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th
Inc. v. Snohomish County, 959 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash. 1998).
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Yet it is not obvious that the "public use" clause should be interpreted in
the formal terms advocated by Professor Echeverria to bar a claimant's re-
covery of compensation for property that the state has irretrievably appropri-
ated when that appropriation is later deemed not to serve a legitimate public
purpose. To Professor Echeverria, takings compensation should not be due in
an instance where the state illegally occupies private property with floodwa-
ters for an extended period of time and it is "impossible to restore the status
quo ante. 213 He intimates that this conduct bears the markings of a tort, and
Congress has waived sovereign immunity for takings, not torts.214 Therefore,
expanding the situations in which takings liability is available cuts against-
through the backdoor-the many justifications for immunity in the tort con-
text.2 15 One concern with this interpretation is that it could perversely incen-
tivize the state to defend takings suits where property restoration is unavaila-
ble by asserting that, in hindsight, its decision did not actually serve a pub-
lic purpose. Yes, takings law ordinarily rears its head only in those instances
where an "otherwise proper" state decision to adjust a property law causes
particular owners to shoulder particular types of responsibilities that are un-
fair and unjust for the state to delineate without compensation. But, in the
words of one federal judge, it would be "bizarre" to "allow the government to
profit from its own error" of unfairly and unjustly depriving individuals of
property that cannot be restored by immunizing it from takings liability.
216
The County might note that causes of action alternative to takings claims
may be available. It seems at least important to consider, however, the great
likelihood that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar any tort claim.
Courts also rarely award civil rights damages for substantive due process or
equal protection violations,2 17 which raises the real possibility that an owner
in this position may have no recourse against the state. Moreover, it is not
evident that the possibility of pursuing a remedy against the state on tort or
civil rights grounds or against those private parties who conducted the up-
stream development should foreclose consideration of a constitutional claim
against the County under the Takings Clause where, but for the County's ap-
proval of development inconsistent with its existing flood control plan, the
flooding would not have occurred and the downstream homes would not have
213 Echeverria, supra note 210, at 1091.
214 id.
215 Id. at 1092 93.
216 Osprey Pac. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 150, 157 (1998).
217 See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court's Damage to § 1983,
16 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 32 (2010) (outlining what the author sees as the "limited ... effective-
ness of § 1983 in serving as the vehicle for private litigation designed to enforce federal constitu-
tional and statutory rights").
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been damaged. To at least some claimants, the flooding damage proved so
extensive that they could no longer live on the land, and it is not clear that any
viable non-residential uses remain.
Seen from this angle, the County's position takes on a peculiar character:
The County effectively suggests that it holds the unfettered ability to dis-
place-i.e., to constructively evict via a physical invasion of flood waters
without providing compensation-even longstanding residents whose uses
the County concedes are causing others no harm, nor exposing others to sys-
temic risk of harm, through its decision not to enforce a law specifically en-
acted to protect these residents' lands and prevent their displacement. The
County cannot justify such authority.
And, from the downstream landowners' perspective, the County's con-
cern that full enforcement of its flood control plan would result in takings
liability to the upstream developers is unfounded. First, the flood control plan
allows a myriad of economic uses to proceed upstream; under the plan, de-
velopment simply must account for and mitigate serious downstream flood-
ing impacts. Furthermore, the County can prohibit all development when
there is an adequate basis for doing so-such as, at the very least, when any
development would put human life in jeopardy-without providing compen-
218
sation.
The County's objection that recognizing takings liability for the non-
enforcement of its flood control plan will stymie harm-preventing regulation
is more formidable, though overstated. Yes, there is a tension between the
view that we want flood control and other laws to be enforced and the conse-
quentialist problem of what liability for non-enforcement would do for regu-
lation more generally. But simply identifying a cost-or, perhaps as here,
adding a new cost in terms of liability risk-does not inevitably dictate that
the state will stop worrying about protecting people and their property from
the risks of flooding. Every regulation come with costs. These costs stand as
reasons against the allocation stemming from a given regulation. However,
what determines the advisability of such a regulation's allocative impact is
whether the reasons for it dwarf those reasons against it.219 And, all things
211 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906 07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding, on remand from the Supreme
Court, that the ordinance in question that denied the claimants' all use of their property was not a
taking because it sought to protect people and property from severe floods); cf Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992) (deeming takings liability inapposite when the
government's decision seeks "to forestall ... grave threats to the lives and property of others").
219 The contention that imposing non-enforcement takings liability in this context will actually
produce the opposite of its intended effect protecting those vulnerable to flooding is a species
of what Professor Duncan Kennedy referred to as the "landlord will raise the rent" argument. See
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
[Vol. 59:1
Non-Enforcement Takings
considered, it seems unlikely that governmental entities would decide en
masse not to conduct flood control studies because the results of those studies
might lead them to adopt new regulations, which their enforcement arms
might later choose not to enforce in a way that unfairly and unjustly singles
out individuals or small groups to bear the negative brunt of those deci-
sions. 220 More likely, the prospect of non-enforcement takings liability will
not discourage the vast majority of governmental entities from conducting
studies and enacting regulations that prevent harmful land uses or impose
generalized obligations of citizenship on landowners to benefit these owners'
communities. Rather, these are the very types of regulations that, in the past,
governmental entities have consistently enforced in accord with the demo-
cratic norms of fairness and justice. For those governmental entities that have
not always heeded these norms, takings liability may well convince them to
change their approach to enforcement rather than incentivize avoidance of
regulation altogether.
The parties' competing positions on the recast version of Harris County
can be summarized as follows. The County might defend the non-
enforcement takings claim by pointing to (1) the reciprocal advantages both
in enacting a flood control plan and in recognizing broad enforcement discre-
tion in the face of finite resources (or, alternatively, the lack of a "public use"
when the government engages in enforcement conduct that is illegitimate, for
no amount of compensation can justify it); (2) the prospect of depriving the
upstream landowners of all or a significant amount of economically viable
uses of their land if the flood control plan is fully enforced; (3) the down-
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 604
(1982). Professor Kennedy ascribed this label in the context of considering the extent to which
landlords will pass along increased responsibilities (such as maintaining rented properties in habit-
able condition) to their tenants in the form of increased rent. Id. As Professor Jeremy Paul has
noted, however, the basic debate plays out in a great many circumstances. See Jeremy Paul, The
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1779, 1821 22 (1991) (arguing that Professor Ken-
nedy's argument applies in almost any case "where the state is considering a modification of exist-
ing economic arrangements that does not disrupt the basic entitlement structure giving economic
power to one party ... over another"). For insightful analysis on the topic, see, for example,
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fidu-
ciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1244 46 (1991) (responding to
the argument, based on the "landlord will raise the rent" concept, that requiring compensation for
displaced employees will hurt instead of help these employees); Joseph William Singer, The Reli-
ance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 720 23 (1988) (discussing and critiquing the
"landlord will raise the rent" argument).
220 Cf Singer, supra note 25, at 633 (deeming "absurd" the argument that people are "deterred
from engaging in daily life just because every minute of the day [they] are obligated to act 'rea-
sonably' to avoid 'foreseeable hann' to others" under tort law's negligence standard) (emphasis
omitted)).
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stream landowners' putting themselves in this flood-risk situation; (4) the
likelihood that imposing liability in this instance will hurt the very people the
imposition of liability is intended to protect-downstream landowners-
because governmental entities will cease adopting flood control plans; and (5)
the availability of potential alternative claims against both the state and the
upstream developers. The downstream residents, on the other hand, might
contend that (1) the County's approach to enforcement unjustifiably singled
them out to bear the burdens of the public purpose of economic development
and expansion of the County's tax base (or, alternatively, the County's alleged
public use is pretext but does not negate takings law's compensation remedy
when the property cannot be restored); (2) enforcement of the flood control
plan is unlikely to fuel a successful takings claim by the upstream landowners
because such a prospective regulation merely would prevent upstream land-
owners from imposing significant harms on other people and their property,
and thereby allow a myriad of uses; (3) the potentiality of alternative claims
should not abrogate a legitimate constitutional claim; and (4) the consequen-
tial impact of imposing liability is both less one-sided and more uncertain
than the County contends.
The competing positions outlined here do not dictate a particular result,
but instead merely serve to highlight that non-enforcement takings cases like
Harris County present more challenging issues than most courts have at-
tributed to them to date. Many of the arguments raised in this discussion of
Harris County are relevant to the additional case examples addressed below,
and those arguments need not be rearticulated in any detail. Nevertheless,
these additional cases also present possibilities for new lines of contention,
possibilities on which the discussion that follows will focus.
2. Non-Enforcement of a Pollution Discharge Permit: Swartz v. Beach
In Swartz v Beach, a 2002 case decided by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Wyoming, an upstream coal company allegedly discharged
more pollutants into a Wyoming river than its state-administered Clean Water
Act (CWA) permit allowed. 221 A downstream rancher, Swartz, contended that,
as a result of the creek's contaminated quality stemming from the company's
discharges, he could no longer water his hay meadows and his soil sustained
221 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1247 49 (D. Wyo. 2002). The company's permits required the
discharge water salinity's level not to exceed an electricity conductivity ("EC") measurement of
two thousand. Id. at 1249. The plaintiff alleges that water samples revealed EC levels above 2000
and that a state investigator "determined that [the coal company] was in violation of its permits."
Id. Nonetheless, according to the plaintiff, the state did not take any enforcement action. Id.
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permanent damage.222 In addition to seeking prospective enforcement of the
permit through the CWA's citizen suit provision, Swartz filed a takings claim
against the state for the impositions he bore to date.223
Diverging from the majority view espoused in Harris County, the feder-
al district court denied the State's motion for summary judgment on the tak-
ings claim. 2 24 Nonetheless, the court did not engage in a detailed analysis on
the takings issue; instead, it merely explained that Swartz had stated a claim
that the State's failure to enforce an issued permit that results in the destruc-
tion of property does not "substantially advance a legitimate government in-
terest" and thus amounts to a compensable taking. 
225
The "substantially advance" language stems from the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1980 decision in Agins v City of Tiburon.2 26 Twenty-five years after
Agins and three years after Swartz, the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron
US.A., Inc. disavowed the "substantially advance" test as singlehandedly de-
terminative of a regulatory taking. 227 The Supreme Court held that this test
authorized a substantive review of the relationship between a regulation's
design and the public goals in adopting it, a traditional due process question,
only more probing. 2 8 Lingle s abandonment of the "substantially advance"
test as singularly determinative of a taking does not suggest, however, that the
222 Id. at 1248.
223 Id. at 1249.
224 Id. at 1267. In doing so, the court addressed and rejected the claim that the CWA's reme-
dial scheme precludes a § 1983 suit under the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea CTammers Assn doctrine. Id. at 1257 58. National Sea Clammers held that plaintiffs cannot
bypass the remedial scheme of a federal statute to assert an alleged violation of that statute under
§ 1983. See 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). Here, the state argued that the plaintiff could have sued the
EPA administrator under the CWA to compel state officials in Wyoming to enforce the permit.
Swartz v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1257 (D. Wyo. 2002) The plaintiffs countered, success-
fully in the federal district court, that regardless of whether there was a viable suit under the
CWA's remedial scheme, they had an independent constitutional claim. Id. This Article proceeds
on the assumption, without reaching a conclusion on the matter, that the court correctly decided
this procedural issue.
225 Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
226 Id. (quoting Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1576 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
117 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
... Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions, supra note 26, at 139. Since its release, Agins' reference
to the "substantially advance" test had fallen under the weight of significant criticism for its mix-
ing due process and takings analyses. See, e.g., John Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to
Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L.J. 853,
857 58 (1999); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Bounda-
ries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 713 (2002); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1605 14 (1988); Richard L. Settle, Regula-
tory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SouND L.
REv. 339, 351 52 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court admitted its error in 2005. See Lingle, 544
U.S. at 548 (abrogating the "substantially advance" test).
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federal district court judge who decided Swartz necessarily would now re-
verse course and grant the State's motion for summary judgment on the tak-
ings issue. The Swartz court interpreted the "substantially advance" test as
requiring an application of the "fact specific inquiry" set out in Penn Central
into "all of the relevant circumstances" to determine whether a regulatory
taking occurred, and simply held that it did not need to conduct such an in-
quiry at this preliminary stage of the litigation to determine that Swartz had
sufficiently alleged a takings claim under the then-standing precedent of
Agins. "'
As with Harris County, and particularly unsurprisingly given the Swartz
court's cursory and now outdated takings analysis, reciting the facts from a
new angle brings the contextual non-enforcement takings question into great-
er light. Consider the following recitation:
In accord with federal and state legislation on water quality, the State of
Wyoming initially made an allocative decision by issuing and setting the
terms of an upstream coal company s permit to discharge coal bed methane
wastewater into Wildcat Creek. Swartz, who owned land downstream of the
coal company, held an adjudicated water right. The coal company s permit
provided security to Swartz against the possibility that the company s pollu-
tion upstream would disrupt his exercise of this water right. For the moment,
the coal company maintained the ability to develop its property, though it was
limited by its permit demanding that it do so in ways that avoided marked
interference with the water usage of its downstream neighbor Although nei-
ther the federal nor state governments formally altered their water quality
laws in any way material to the coal company s discharges of its wastewater,
the state, according to Swartz, adjusted its allocative decision informally by
choosing not to enforce the terms of the permit it had issued to the coal com-
pany, despite Swartz s numerous requests. As a result, the state allegedly re-
distributed Swartz s security to the upstream coal company, to the point where
the coal company could discharge wastewater so "toxic" that Swartz con-
tended that he could no longer exercise his water right and his soil had been
permanently damaged.230
229 See Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002)). Language in the Swartz opinion such as the
court's assertion that a viable taking based on "a public official's failure to perform [her] statutory
and regulatory duties [that] results in the destruction of private property to the point it is no longer
'financially viable' suggests that, had the Swartz court conducted a Penn Central analysis, the
rancher's claim would have been deemed at least sufficient to survive sumnmary judgment. See id.
at 1263.
23 See id. at 1247 49. On this framing, Swartz mirrors in many ways the dispute in Litz v.
Maryland Dep't of the Env 't. See 131 A.3d 923, 925 27 (Md. 2016). In the Litz case, the owner of
a private lake in Maryland, Gail Litz, contended that, as a result of the state government's failure
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This refraining helps identify the relevant question as whether the Coun-
ty allocated property rights in contravention of the principles of fairness and
justice absent compensation. How might the parties respond to this question?
State Positions: The State might contend that it actually was enforcing
the coal company's permit, if admittedly not in the manner Swartz preferred.
It had investigated complaints of permit violations on multiple occasions and,
upon identifying areas of concern, informally requested that the coal compa-
ny remedy the problems moving forward. Eschewing the official sanctions
Swartz desired in favor of more informal measures-such as phone calls,
emails, and warning letters-is both a less expensive tactic and often all that
is needed to prompt compliance. Regularly and immediately resorting to the
most stringent available enforcement mechanisms can prompt regulated par-
ties to be less cooperative in the future on the view that enforcement officials
did not act sensibly or treat them with respect. 231 Perhaps non-enforcement
takings liability should be reserved for instances in which the State's decision
not to enforce borders on bad faith or reflects a complete and utter failure to
implement a legitimate standing law. To the extent the coal company's dis-
charge negatively affects Swartz outside of these rare circumstances, he
should direct his ire and litigation strategy at the company itself
Alternatively, the State might assert that it made the conscious decision
to risk the viability of Swartz's field by not enforcing the coal company's
permit for what it deemed the greater common good of developing coal bed
** 232
methane at the lowermost cost in the midst of an energy crisis. Such a deci-
sion is by no means clear-cut, but it is one the State's enforcement arm should
have space to make without the constant threat of a takings claim for an al-
leged injury, not to something as intimate as Swartz's home, but rather to his
ranching business. That Swartz was "first" to the river's water relative to the
coal company does not give him absolute, vested immunity from important
obligations of citizenship that-much like changing conceptions of what con-
stitutes, for instance, a nuisance-might be recognized in the future.
Claimant Positions: The downstream water user, Swartz, might counter
that although the State's decision to avoid meaningful enforcement of the
company's discharge permit is one approach to fulfilling the goal of develop-
ing coal bed methane at the lowermost cost, concentrating this type of re-
to enforce a state-town consent order in which a town promised to address leaks from nearby pri-
vate septic tanks, her lake became polluted and she could no longer operate her campground busi-
ness on the site, such that the state must pay her takings compensation. Id.
231 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1751 (2006)
(suggesting that enforcement officials' beginning with less stringent, infornal approaches can
"strengthen[] trust between individuals and the state").
232 Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
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sponsibility on Swartz requires compensation. There is no semblance of re-
ciprocal advantage stemming from the state's approach to enforcement here.
That remedies may be available against the coal company (which is no surety
under federal and state law) 233 should not negate the prospect of one's ability
to proceed on a constitutional claim against the State where, but for the
State's decision not to enforce the coal company's permit, Swartz's family
ranching operation would not have suffered the tremendous damage-indeed,
destruction-that it did. The state did not change the contours of nuisance
law, yet it effectively authorized the upstream company to conduct its activi-
ties in a manner that limits the meaningfulness of Swartz's ability to seek re-
dress for nuisance-like harms. And Swartz's use of the land was not particu-
larly sensitive but instead rather routine. According to Swartz, the land's soil
had long served as the basis of Swartz's and his ancestors' livelihood. That
soil is now so poisoned that it is not only unusable at the moment, but it will
never recover to its once remarkably fertile condition.
Contemplating state liability when the coal company may bear some or
even most of the blameworthiness is not a matter of seeking deep pockets.
Instead, the key is whether the state owes some duty that it breached here,
such that it is morally and legally responsible for the harm caused to the
plaintiff's property rights. Swartz may well have been hurt by two parties ra-
ther than one.
The foregoing discussion suggests that Swartz, like Harris County, is a
challenging case when conceived in terms of whether informal adjustments to
property allocations accomplished via non-enforcement are fair and just ab-
23
sent compensation. 3  The case highlights the reality that whether non-
enforcement has occurred is itself a source of great debate and demonstrates
the complexity of determining the extent to which competing public interests
contribute to non-resource-driven non-enforcement. The below discussion on
the final example, Alger v Department of Labor & Industry, touches on these
same matters, though it also prompts one to contemplate the extent to which
traditionally vulnerable parties might suffer the effects of inequitable, even if
subconscious, patterns of non-enforcement.235
233 The coal company asserted that Swartz could not avail himself of the CWA's citizen suit
provision because the state water quality standards that Swartz sought to enforce were more strin-
gent than the federal standards and therefore unenforceable under the CWA. Id. at 1268 69. Sup-
port for the company's position on this point is available in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v.
Eastman Kodak Co. See 12 F.3d 353, 358 59 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, even if Swartz were to
find some relief under state administrative law, it is possible that this relief would take only a
prospective form, not reimburse him for the injuries he already has sustained.234 See supra notes 221 233 and accompanying text.
235 See infra notes 236 270 and accompanying text.
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3. Non-Enforcement of a Housing Code: Alger v. Department of
Labor & Industry
Alger involved the alleged non-enforcement of Vermont's housing
code .236 According to numerous tenants, the state agency charged with im-
plementing the State's housing code occasionally issued orders requesting
compliance from certain landlords, yet for years effectively allowed these
landlords to ignore order after order regarding the same violations because it
failed to utilize the code's enforcement powers to pursue injunctive relief,
impose administrative penalties, assess fines, or seek prosecution. 37 Only
when it realized these violations had created a collection of such precarious
conditions (such as no working heat, electricity, smoke detectors, plumbing,
and leaking gas)238 did the agency act: it ordered the buildings immediately
vacated. 239 The tenants contended that this pattern of non-enforcement took
their property by converting (a) their right to occupy their leased units into (b)
"an illusory right to remain in imminently hazardous" conditions until they
ultimately were forced to vacate, such that they were due compensation from
the state for, at minimum, their relocation costs.
240
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision comes closer than those in Har-
ris County, Swartz, or any other reported opinions addressing alleged non-
enforcement takings in tracking the understanding of property and takings
law advanced in this Article. According to the court, the tenants were not
seeking compensation based on the government's decision to order their
buildings vacated when a nuisance-such as the fire hazards associated with
the electrical deficiencies-threated the surrounding community.241 Rather,
the court interpreted the tenants' claims as seeking compensation for the fore-
seeable results of the government's "allowing the nuisance to continue una-
bated for so long. 242 The court held that, to avoid takings liability for failing
236 Alger v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d 508, 511 (Vt. 2006).
237 Id. at 511 13.
...Id. at 511 14, 518.
239 Id. at 511 (recounting the state's requiring vacation within ten days).
141 Id. at 521. Like the fee interest in Harris County and the adjudicated water right in Swartz,
leaseholds have been deemed property for purposes of takings review. See, e.g., Alamo Land &
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) ("It has long been established that the holder of
an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled ... to just compensation ... when [that interest]
is taken upon condemnation by the United States.") (citations omitted); A.W. Duckett & Co. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 149, 150 52 (1924) (holding that a leasehold is a property interest requir-
ing compensation if taken by the government).
241 Id. at 520 21; see also Eno v. City of Burlington, 209 A.2d 499, 504 (Vt. 1965) (finding
that "[a] fire hazard is a nuisance and the abatement of such a nuisance is not the taking of proper-
ty ... for which compensation must be made").
242 Alger, 917 A.2d at 521.
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to abate this nuisance, the government must "lack responsibility for the exi-
,,243gency.
Still, a clearer formulation of the State's alleged non-enforcement of its
housing code as an adjustment to the State's allocation of property interests
can help illuminate the competing perspectives on the non-enforcement tak-
ings question as it has been articulated in this Article. One might reframe the
case as follows:
In adopting its housing code, the State of Vermont made an allocative
decision in setting minimum standards for the creation of residential lease-
hold estates. The housing code distributed security to all tenants from their
landlords' interference with their use and occupancy of their rented units in
myriad ways.244 For the moment, landowners obviously maintained the abil
ity to rent their properties for residential purposes, though they were limited
by the code s requirement that they provide and maintain boilers, 245 fire safety
measures,246 electrical installations, 247 plumbing, 248 insect- and rodent-free24
quarters, 2 and the like in all leased premises. Although the state did not
formally alter the housing code, it allegedly adjusted its original allocative
decision by choosing not to draw on the code s enforcement provisions
including its powers to pursue injunctive relief impose administrative penal-
ties, assess fines, and seek prosecution despite numerous requests by tenants
that it do so. As a result, according to the tenants, the state redistributed the
tenants 'security interest to their landlords, to the point where these landlords
could wholly disregard the housing code until, if ever, the state ordered these
buildings vacated.
Mirroring Harris County and Swartz, the question on this refraining of
Alger is whether the State's adjustment to property law through its approach
to enforcement of its housing code contravenes fairness and justice norms to
243 Id. The State had argued that it "owe[d] no duty to tenants." Brief of Defendants/Appellees
at 7, Alger v. Dep't of Labor &. Indus., 917 A.2d 508 (2006) (No. 05-001), 2005 WL 1464527, at
*7.
244 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457 (West 1985) ("In any residential rental agreement, the land-
lord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant to deliver over and maintain, throughout the period
of the tenancy, premises that are safe, clean, and fit for human habitation and which comply with
the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health regulations."); Rental Housing Health
Code, 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 2.0 (1974) (amended 2006) ("The purpose of this code is to pro-
tect the health, safety and well-being of the occupants of rental housing. This code establishes
minimum health and habitability standards that all residential rental housing in Vermont must
conform to.").
245 See fit. 20, § 2881; 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 7.0.
246 See fit. 20, § 2681(a).
247 See fit. 26, § 881; 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 9.0.
248 See fit. 26, § 2198.
249 See 13-140-031 Code Vt. R. § 6.0.
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the point where it rises to the level of a compensable taking. Once more, we
can contemplate the parties' competing positions, concentrating not on those
arguments that already have been articulated in the course of discussing the
prior examples but instead on additional lines of argument specifically impli-
cated by Alger s context.
State Positions: The State of Vermont might argue that it justifiably
chose what it deemed to be the most effective approach to enforcement of the
State's housing code in light of its resource constraints. Although the decision
not to enforce in Swartz may have been targeted against a specific kind of
regulated entity (coal bed methane producers), the Vermont agency's deci-
sions regarding enforcement are generally applicable in the following way:
the agency indiscriminately inspects alleged violations as it is able, issues
notices of code violations, and orders the closure of dangerous housing when
those code violations go uncorrected. Tenants may not like the choices the
agency has made regarding the manner of and pace with which it is enforcing
its housing code. It is far from clear, however, that they hold a constitutionally
protected property right in their leases as defined by their preferred method of
enforcement. Whether such a property right exists is particularly unclear ab-
sent evidence that obstinate landlords would be more likely to comply if the
state were to rely more heavily on, say, imposing monetary penalties and
seeking injunctive relief than they are under the current policy.
Claimant Positions: The tenants must concede that resource constraints
often are a primary and understandable reason underlying the reality that all
arguable violations of all laws cannot possibly be pursued. In some instances,
despite diligent efforts, an agency's limited number of enforcement officials
simply may not yet have gotten to the file that is pertinent to the takings
claimant's case. 250 Some offenses, such as housing code violations, occur so
frequently that avoiding non-enforcement would be a wholly impractical
goal. That the law's expansiveness outpaces its conceivable enforcement does
not necessarily raise concerns regarding the State's accountability. Neverthe-
less, the tenants might inquire whether there is some juncture at which the
government's pointing to a lack of resources loses its potency. Should a lack
of resources be a perpetually failsafe defense for a state agency's non-
enforcement when it comes to, for example, a landlord's mining tenants' units
by failing to fix gas leaks that both the landlord and the agency have known
about for some time? Is there any limit-even if only the functional equiva-
lent of confiscation-to which select tenants should bear the full brunt of re-
250 Such instances potentially implicate the ripeness requirements necessary to proceed on a
takings claim. For a particularly thorough and insightful look at ripeness doctrine in the regulatory
takings context, see Gregory M. Stein_ Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in Federal Courts, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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source-constrained enforcement decisions? Is there any room outside the or-
dinary and expansive space where the state can maneuver in enforcing law? It
is not immediately obvious that pointing to a lack of resources is a sufficient
justification for non-enforcement when the state has come up with the money
to fund a court system by which landlords can evict tenants.2 5 1 Why should
landlords' property rights to eviction be protected but tenants' property rights
to habitable housing should not?252
In certain situations where offenses are frequent-such as temporary
trespasses to avoid puddles or to collect personal items such as a child's
wayward ball-marked non-enforcement may be desirable. Indeed, where the
offending conduct is widespread and perceived as only marginally harmful,
non-enforcement might mirror social consensus that full enforcement is actu-
ally not only undesirable but perverse.53 In others, though, the stakes are far
251 On this view, Alger bears some loose similarities to the Supreme Court's decision in Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. Cf 455 U.S. 422, 435 39 (1982). In Logan, the state established a
property right to file a timely charge of unlawful termination from employment and created a
system by which to protect and enforce that property right. Id. at 424. Under this system, when the
state held timely conferences, the claimant's case would be heard in full on the merits, but where
the state missed the deadline by which it was required to hold such a conference, the claimant's
case however meritorious would be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 425 27. The Court found
this system could serve as the basis for a due process claim and deemed the system unconstitu-
tionally irrational on due process grounds. Id. at 432 ("[A]ny other conclusion would allow the
State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest."). In Alger, the state similarly
established a property right (in habitable rental housing) and created a system by which to protect
and enforce that property right. 917 A.2d at 511. In implementing this system, the state did not
draw on its statutory powers to enforce the tenants' property rights until conditions became so
precarious that it ordered the non-compliant buildings vacated. Id. at 511 12. The Vermont Su-
preme Court found the state's approach to-its system of-enforcement not as a mere instance of
governmental misconduct but rather one that could serve as the basis of a claim that the state un-
fairly and unjustly took the tenants' property rights without compensation. Id. at 521 22. The
same could be said of Harris County: Instead of the court irrefutably presuming that a lack of
resources is a perpetual and failsafe state defense to a claim of non-enforcement, the impacted
parties the downstream residents who have lost their homes to flooding due to upstream devel-
opment approved in contravention of an existing flood control plan are merely asking the court
to assess whether the state's pointing to a lack of resources is a sufficient justification for non-
enforcement absent compensation when the state has come up with the money to fund a permitting
system and infrastructure expansion by which other parties-here, the upstream developers-can
use their properties to produce these foreseeable impacts.
252 Cf. Underkuffler, supra note 25, at 752 (asserting that 'Jilt is difficult to see why the prop-
erty interests of some should be exalted, and the same interests of others ignored, in a searching
assessment of 'justice"'). This choice is especially problematic when it renders people homeless in
those places where other rules of law make it illegal for homeless people to exist anywhere at all.
See Mulvaney & Singer, supra note 13, at 1 ("When cities prohibit sleeping on sidewalks and in
parks, those homeless persons whom the police ask to 'move along' from these public spaces have
begun to respond with a simple question: 'Move along to where?"').
253 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1395, 1400
nn.16 18 (2002) (discussing this possibility in the context of enforcing underage drinking in col-
lege towns).
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higher, such as the ability to reasonably conduct one's longstanding family
business (as in Swartz),254 or, even more importantly, as here, to occupy the
home one has lived in for some time and planned to remain in for the consid-
erable future given its proximity to, say, the occupants' employment and their
children's schools.255
The tenants are not baldly claiming that they have been deprived of a
right to the State's enforcing the law. Rather, they are asserting that the State
has deprived them of a right to continue occupying the premises they rented,
and that non-enforcement of the housing code is the mechanism for the dep-
rivation. The housing code creates property rights in tenants to habitable
housing that only exist or vest if the conduct of other property owners-their
landlords-is regulated and the interests of these other owners are subjected
to a covenant of sorts. The State's non-enforcement of this covenant has pro-
duced not the constructive, moral equivalent of divestment and eviction here,
but divestment and eviction itself The State's allowing, in the Vermont Su-
preme Court's words, "the nuisance to continue unabated for so long, 256 re-
sulted in the tenants being unable to use their residences at all. Is eviction in
these circumstances to be treated merely "as part of the burden of common
citizenship, 257 such that it is justified even without compensation for the ten-
ants' cost of finding alternative housing?258 Does a leasehold estate include
any protection at all against the state's unfairly and unjustifiably putting a
tenant out on the street without compensation?
The tenants might concede that there is no direct evidence that the
State's non-enforcement of the housing code is the product of intentional hos-
tility toward certain individuals or groups, which might result from an official
discriminatory policy or stem from individual executive officers' biases
through which certain tenants' complaints constantly find their way to the
254 See supra notes 221 233 and accompanying text (discussing the Swartz case).
255 See supra notes 194 220 and accompanying text (discussing Harris County).
256 Alger, 917 A.2d at 521.
257 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
258 The precise measure of compensation for a non-enforcement taking is fodder for future
work. Takings compensation generally is measured by what the government gets, not what the
tenant lost. On the facts of Alger, the government could be understood to have reaped the market
value of refusing to enforce the housing code to the point where that decision resulted in the dep-
rivation of the tenants' right to continue occupying their leased premises. See 917 A.2d at 511 14.
Somewhat peculiarly, it is also doctrinally possible that a court could find a taking occurred but no
compensation is due. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2597 (2013) (explaining that compensation may not be available for "unconstitutional conditions
claims predicated on the Takings Clause"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446
N.E.2d 428, 434 35 (N.Y. 1983) (holding, on remand following the Supreme Court's conclusion
that a regulation authorizing cable wiring on the claimant's building constituted a taking, that
nominal compensation of one dollar was due).
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bottom of the government's priority list. But if not overtly intentional, non-
enforcement nonetheless can result from the reactionary tendency to steer the
benefits of enforcement against the politically powerless .259 These tenants may
be unable to summon their political representatives and institutions to respond
to their rights and needs. In this context, political powerlessness and need may
present an especially dangerous combination: the poorest areas need the most
enforcement of statewide housing codes, yet wealthy communities with min-
imal housing code issues may be loath to support the direction of their tax
monies to this purpose 262 The general applicability of the state's approach to
enforcement is, on this view, not a positive characteristic here, but instead
reflects this approach's unreserved failure to account for the needs of its most
vulnerable citizens-the very low-income tenants housing codes are most
prominently enacted to protect.
261
It bears keeping in mind, though, that although traditionally vulnerable
persons and groups often shoulder the negative impacts of non-enforcement,
decisions not to enforce also can assist and even empower these same vulner-
able individuals and groups. In their characteristically imaginative way, Pro-
fessors Eduardo Pefialver and Sonia Katyal have explained that employing a
machine that could identify and enjoin every violation of an existing property
law would disregard two important precepts advanced by those "outlaws"
who engage in such facially proscribed acts. 262 First, some violations of prop-
erty rights can lead to democratic action that furthers a more just distribu-
263tion. For example, Native Americans' occupation of Alcatraz Island led to
policy changes supporting tribes.2 64 Second, violations of property rights can
provide information that disproves widespread understandings and thereby
shed light on the injustices of existing laws. 65 Some laws, that is, do need to
be called into question. For instance, lunch counter sit-ins disproved the pre-
vailing view among many southern whites that blacks liked the segregation of
Jim Crow. 66 From a functional perspective, violating existing property laws
259 In turn- Swartz raises the possibility of the inverse phenomenon: steering the benefits of
enforcement towardthe politically powerful. See supra notes 221 233 and accompanying text.
260 See generally Natapoff, supra note 231 (making a similar point in the context enforcing
criminal laws).
211 Cf Dukes v. Durante, 471 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Conn. 1984) ("[C]ommon sense and reason
compel the conclusion that the [state] defendants cannot act under the housing code, which is to
protect the health and safety of the occupants, and then abandon the displacees.").
212 EDUARDO M. PENALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: How SQUATTERS,
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 143-65 (2010).
263 Id. at 143 58.
264 Id. at vii Viii.
265 Id. at 159 65.
211 Id. at 64 70. Professor Alexandra Natapoff argues that, in the context of civil disobedi-
ence, "underenforcement is a sign of truly responsive government, one that recognizes that not all
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is one of the few tools available for those who have been marginalized by the
current delineation and allocation of property interests to express concerns
about distributive justice. 267
In addition to those precepts noted by Professors Pefialver and Katyal,
there are also some instances where an accounting of the human stories be-
hind the particular lawbreaker and that lawbreaker's objectors might counsel
in favor of non-enforcement. 268 For one prominent example, a federal district
court concluded that the City of Miami could not arrest homeless people for
urinating in public when the city did not offer enough beds in city shelters to
accommodate its homeless population,269 though the court's decision did not
impede continued enforcement of the city's prohibition on public urination
against members of less vulnerable populations, including, as it were, profes-
sional football players.27o
The Alcatraz occupation, lunch counter sit-in, and public urination ex-
amples illustrate the possibility that non-enforcement can serve to vindicate
interests that sit in competition with those that underlie the law that the state
is choosing not to enforce. Determining whether and in what precise circum-
stances it would be fair to deem the interests served by non-enforcement su-
perior to those served by enforcement without affording compensation to
those negatively impacted parties poses marked challenges. However, that
these examples exist at all reveals non-enforcement's role as a mechanism by
which property allocations can be adjusted in the face of changing social and
economic conditions and evolving moral positions on the values that we most
cherish. Though an admittedly weighty task, perhaps takings law can, in cases
such as Alger, play a role in enhancing our democracy by ensuring that un-
compensated adjustments made via non-enforcement occur in a fair and just
manner.
laws deserve to be enforced all of the time and that principles of democratic accountability some-
times require law enforcement to make room for public deviance." See Natapoff, supra note 231,
at 1743.
267 See PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 262, at 14.
268 See, e.g., Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions, supra note 26, at 164 65 (suggesting that the
identity of the parties involved in property disputes should be considered at times); Underkuffler,
supra note 99, at 363 66 (discussing PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 262, and noting the im-
portance of the identities of both lawbreakers and their objectors in certain cases).
269 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1582 85 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Magadini,
52 N.E.3d at 1051 ("[T]he necessity defense allows ajury to consider the plight of a homeless person
against any harms caused by a trespass before determining criminal responsibility.").
271 See, e.g., Kyle Munzenrieder, Former Dolphin Tyrell Johnson Arrestedfor Peeing in Pub-
lic on Miami Beach, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/
former-dolphin-tyrell-johnson-arrested-for-peeing-in-public-on-miami-beach-6527133 [https://
perma.cc/2YK8-G54U]; see also Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions, supra note 26, at 167 68.
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Like Harris County and Swartz, Alger presents a challenging case when
conceived in terms of whether adjustments to property allocations accom-
plished via non-enforcement align with the principles of fairness and justice
absent compensation. Among other issues, the case reiterates, and in some
ways strengthens, the importance of deferring to state decisions to establish
priorities in the face of resource constraints. At the same time, though, it
brings into view the distinct possibility that traditionally vulnerable parties
might suffer the effects of imbalanced dedications of enforcement resources,
which, here, may well have produced the devastating effect of exacerbating
homelessness.
C. Summary Non-Enforcement Takings
The preceding sections illustrate through several contemporary exam-
ples how one might evaluate a non-enforcement decision's alignment with
fairness and justice as those principles have been illuminated through regula-
tory takings precedent explicitly or implicitly interpreting the considerations
discussed as relevant in Penn Central. Some examples-including those in-
volving the non-enforcement of trespass laws, roadway maintenance provi-
sions, and vehicular speed limits-present relatively non-controversial tak-
ings issues. 271 The non-enforcement of a flood control plan, a water pollution
discharge permit, and a housing code, however, are more challenging on
these terms in light of the context within which they arose in Harris County,
Swartz, and Alger, respectively.2 72 In short, the claimants in these cases sug-
gest that they are unfairly and unjustly tasked with shouldering, via non-
enforcement, a burden of a type and severity that is not borne by similarly
situated parties and that they should not have been saddled with anticipating.
Meanwhile, the government entities contend that these impositions do not
amount to compensable burdens, but instead should be considered broadly
reciprocated obligations of ownership in service of the public interest that are
fair and just without compensation. In sum, the discussion in this Part sug-
gests that the government's decision not to enforce an existing property regu-
lation can, albeit in very rare instances, present a situation in which takings
liability should be considered a viable option. 273
271 See supra notes 170 191 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 192 270 and accompanying text.
273 Although the concentration here is on takings law, it bears mentioning that there may well
be alternative, non-constitutional mechanisms that present a course to provide at least partial pro-
tections for those unfairly bearing the weight of non-enforcement decisions, such as the flood-
prone homeowners in Harris County, the downstream rancher unable to water his crops in Swartz,
and the displaced tenants in Alger. For one example, courts might prompt legislatures to allocate
enforcement funding in a more just manner, as exhibited in some school funding jurisprudence.
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CONCLUSION
This Article makes three preliminary claims on which its theory of non-
enforcement takings liability rests. First, whatever the value of describing
certain constitutional rights as "negative" in the sense that they afford protec-
tion against government interference, this vocabulary is not adequate to ex-
plain the institution of property. Although the government's non-interference
with one's constitutional right to, say, association or free speech generally
does not implicate others' rights to associate or speak freely, the government's
"non-interference" with one's claim to property necessarily interferes with
others' claims to the same. Second, a system of private property in a constitu-
tional democracy demands that the state make allocative choices through the
definition and enforcement of property rights. Therefore, the usefulness of
distinguishing between state "action" and state "inaction" in the property
sphere is not evident, for both "action" (say, enacting and enforcing a statute)
and "inaction" (not enforcing an enacted statute or not enacting the statute at
all) are decisions that have profound allocational effects. The state unavoida-
bly has to choose between conflicting interests in most every property dis-
pute. Third, these allocative choices must be made with reference to social
goals; therefore, the same normative judgments that underlie the enactment
and enforcement of new laws underlie the non-enforcement of existing ones.
From these preliminary claims, the following thesis emerges: The non-
enforcement of existing property laws is not logically separable from the is-
sue of unfair and unjust state deprivations of property rights at which the
Constitution's Takings Clause takes aim. This Article suggests that takings
law should police allocations resulting from non-enforcement decisions on
the same "fairness and justice" grounds that it polices allocations resulting
from decisions to enact and enforce new regulations. Rejecting the extant ma-
jority position that state decisions not to enforce existing property laws are
See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the state of Vermont's
public school funding program "violates the right to equal educational opportunities under.., the
Vermont Constitution). Another example of such jurisprudence is the New Jersey Supreme
Court's innovative decisions regarding the provision of affordable housing. See, e.g., S. Burling-
ton Cly. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 490 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the town-
ship must provide "a realistic opportunity for [affordable] housing" to the economically disadvan-
taged). For a third example, perhaps the legislature might impose on itself, local governments, and
those administrative agencies with the power to enact regulations a requirement to outline in more
detail than they often do the methods by which new laws and regulations should be enforced,
particularly in the face of resource and personnel constraints. Where enforcement officials diverge
from these methods, the burden of persuasion might shift to the government to justify this diver-
gence or offer some form of transition relief. New applications of existing common or statutory
laws and proposed adjustments to these non-constitutional bodies of law on behalf of those im-
pacted by non-enforcement can serve as fodder for future work.
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categorically immune from takings liability is not to advocate that persons
impacted by such decisions should be automatically or even regularly entitled
to the Takings Clause's constitutional remedy. Rather, it simply suggests that
courts should resist the temptation to formulaically and categorically prohibit
non-enforcement takings claims in favor of assessing those claims on the
merits.
What might such a merits-based assessment entail? Regulatory takings
law, if imperfectly, recognizes that the socially-crafted nature of the institu-
tion of property makes property rights accountable to the values that charac-
terize our democracy, such that the substance of property laws must be collec-
tively adjusted as social, economic, and moral perspectives on the content of
these values-and conceptions of what might harm these values-change
over time. At the same time, though, this body of law reflects the judiciary's
appreciation for the idea that property owners and non-owners alike expect
that these adjustments to property laws will be made in accord with the dem-
ocratic principles of "fairness and justice," the meaning of which are to be
determined through contextualized application of the types of considerations
set out in Penn Central and elaborated by precedent.
Non-enforcement takings law generally should track this same course.
Takings claims grounded in non-enforcement should be as unlikely to suc-
ceed as traditional regulatory takings claims in light of the broad deference
afforded to state officials tasked with implementing democratically-enacted
regulatory safeguards and obligations in the face of resource and personnel
constraints, concerns regarding rivalrous harms, competing public interests,
and constantly evolving human values. Nevertheless, there are some extreme
cases in which it is not fair or just for the state to decline to enforce existing
law without adequate justification for its refusal to provide compensation.
Although there are no rigid lines, non-enforcement takings claims, as in the
regulatory takings context, should be more likely to trigger takings liability
when the state's decision (1) unjustifiably fails to prevent confiscation or sig-
nificant degradation of a legally recognized interest (such as a covenant or
nuisance-like property right) that is not causing harm or interfering with oth-
ers' legitimate property rights; (2) unjustifiably authorizes third party occupa-
tion of privately owned property that is not open to the public; (3) unjustifi-
ably singles out individuals among similarly situated persons to bear a wholly
disproportionate weight of a non-enforcement decision instead of legitimately
adjusting property allocations wholesale; or (4) retroactively and unjustifiably
diverges from what a reasonable owner could have possibly expected when
she invested in property and put that property to a legitimate and continuing
non-harmful use in reliance on existing law.
Failing to acknowledge property's allocative nature and the inherent un-
constructiveness of distinguishing between action and inaction in the property
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sphere runs the risk of concealing the full impact of collective choices at the
expense of the principles of fairness and justice upon which takings law rests.
Recognizing non-enforcement takings claims on the terms outlined here pre-
sents the Takings Clause not as a regularly-available tool to limit democratic
decisions that serve to define and allocate property interests in the face of
changing conditions, or, alternatively, as categorically inapplicable to a cer-
tain class of such decisions. Instead, it conceives of the Takings Clause as a
tool that might be drawn upon in narrow circumstances to enhance such dem-
ocratic decision making by assuring that non-enforcement decisions, like de-
cisions to enact and enforce new regulations, are made with the fairness and
justice of the responsibilities those decisions impose in mind.

